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Abstract 	   After the Tunisian military abandoned President Ben Ali, ending his thirty-year 
reign, Middle East security analyst Steven Cook quipped, “Aren’t Middle Eastern 
militaries supposed to crack down and kick butt? Aren’t they supposed to be the 
‘backbone’ of regimes? The guarantors of last resort? The ultimate instrument of political 
control?” All existing scholarship on Middle Eastern civil-military relations pointed to a 
simple but resounding answer: yes. But as the Arab Spring unfolded, two paradoxical 
images emerged: one, in Syria, where the military lived up the Cook’s billing, as it 
continues to kill tens of thousands Syrians in a civil war; the other, in Egypt, where the 
military embraced the protesters and refused to use violence, effectively rejecting Cook’s 
characterization. This paper will examine how each regime’s civil-military relationship 
dictated the results of Arab Spring protests, paying particular attention to levels of 
violence and defection as predictors of regime collapse. It will find that civil-military 
relations were a strong predictor of regime collapse at relatively high levels of violence 
and that coup-proofing methods, while effective in staving off coups, actually catalyzed 
the defection of the military and, consequently, the collapse of regimes. 	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On becoming soldiers we have not ceased to be citizens. 
 Anonymous spokesman for Cromwell’s soldiers, 1647  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  Middle East analyst Be’eri famously alleged, “Without the active participation or 
at least the expressive approval of commanders of the military, no Arab government can 
hold on to the reigns of power.”1 After World War II, he was right: coups constantly 
created turmoil throughout the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, making it 
so any leader who wanted to maintain power in an Arab state had to placate the military 
or risk being deposed. Between March 1949 and December 1980, there were an 
astonishing 55 coup attempts carried out by Arab militaries, about half of which were 
successful. 2  This furious rate of turnover, combined with the perpetual Arab-Israeli 
conflict, still dictates the narrative of constant instability in the Middle East that pervades 
Western thought. As the 1970s gave way to the modern era in the MENA region, though, 
coup d'états became a rarity in the Arab world and stability took over as the norm: 
regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia and 
Yemen have or had held power for more than 20 years before 2011.3  
 When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2011, most believed that the protests 
would be dealt with in the same way as dissent had been dealt with throughout the Arab 
world in recent history: with a heavy enough hand to keep the autocratic ruler in power.4 
Foreign Policy analyst Steven Cook succinctly captured the universal expectation as the 
protests broke out: “Aren’t Middle Eastern militaries supposed to crack down and kick 
butt? Aren’t they supposed to be the ‘backbone’ of regimes? The guarantors of last 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Be'eri, Eliezer. "The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics." Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1982): 
2 Be’eri, “The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics,” 70. 
3 Brooks, Risa. 1998. Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes. Adelphi Paper 324. 
New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies.  
4 Insert some examples here 
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resort? The ultimate instrument of political control?”5 Thirty plus years of history and 
political science literature gave a resounding answer: yes. 
However, with unprecedented international attention focused on the region, the 
world watched as Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia in the night, as Hosni Mubarak 
defiantly attempted to remain in power before being brushed aside by the military, and as 
Libya descended into civil war amidst calls for the eccentric Muammar Qaddafi to step 
down before he was eventually captured and killed by rebel forces—an humiliating end 
viewed by the world on CNN. Although it received much less coverage, the Ali Abdullah 
Salehalso regime in Yemen collapsed after nearly 30 years of rule. Protests occurred in 
19 countries, representing many regime types, economic conditions, and levels of 
political freedom. The stability of the previous 30 years was thrown out the window in a 
matter of weeks, ushering Arab militaries into the spotlight as they were forced to choose 
between protesters and the regime.  
Risa Brooks’ conclusion that “the military’s central position stems from its status 
as the primary repository of force, and hence the final guarantor of power” serves as the 
intellectual backbone of this project.6 It was the military that stabilized the region after 
the tumultuous 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the relationship has been widely noted as 
essential the lasting stability of autocratic regimes while much of the world saw 
democratic transitions. Eva Bellin, for example, noted in 2004 that the state’s coercive 
apparatus maintained “the will and capacity” to suppress democratic movements, an 
essential element to the disproportionate resistance of authoritarianism in the MENA 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Cook, Steven. "The Calculations on Tunisia's Military." Foreign Policy, 1/20/2011. 
6 Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 18. 
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region compared to other developing regions.7 If the military was so essential to the 
decades of stability in the MENA region, it is imperative to understand what role it had in 
destabilizing the region and why it took that role where it did. As the primary exporter of 
state power and the institution capable of committing the most physical harm against 
citizens, it is imperative that we understand trends in military action. Doing so will allow 
us to have a better understanding of possible institutional structures that will lend 
themselves to high levels of violence in future antigovernment protest movements across 
the globe. With such an understanding, human security in autocratic states could be 
improved. Less optimistically, such an understanding would provide insight into 
weaknesses and strengths that could be applied to autocratic regime stability. In other 
words, an autocratic ruler who reads this paper will be very interested to understand the 
structural failures and successes of civil-military relations in MENA regimes during the 
Arab Spring.   
How, then, would the various militaries react to mass protests? How would their 
reactions be similar? How would they be different? How much of an effect would Arab 
militaries really have on the outcome of the protests? Would they really serve as the 
linchpin to stability as Be’eri, Brooks, and Bellin all believed? What role would state 
violence play in the outcome of the movements and what role would the military play in 
that violence? How would the structure of the military influence its response to the 
protests? In what circumstances would the military stand by its regime? And when would 
it defect? What would the consequences be of both? This paper will address these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 143.  
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   9	  
questions, using the Table #1 as a basis for its analysis. The main variables examined are 
Results of Protests, Civil-Military Relations, Level of Violence, and Military Response, 
as the paper will attempt to unpack the role of the military in regime stability.8  
Table #1: Militaries in the Arab Spring 
Country Result of Protests Regime Type Civil-Military Relations Level of Violence Military 
Response 
Algeria No Collapse Military Autocratic officer-politician Low Loyal 
Bahrain No Collapse Monarchy Mercenaries Intermediate Loyal 
Djibouti No Collapse Single Party Independent Low Loyal 
Egypt Collapse Personalist Autocratic officer-politician Intermediate Defect 
Iran No Collapse Theocracy Dual Low Loyal 
Iraq No Collapse Democracy Independent Low Loyal 
Jordan No Collapse Monarchy Tribally dependent monarchy Low Loyal 
Kuwait No Collapse Monarchy Tribally dependent monarchy None Loyal 
Lebanon No Collapse Democracy Independent None Loyal 
Libya Collapse Personalist Dual High Fracture 
Mauritania No Collapse Military Autocratic officer-politician None Loyal 
Morocco No Collapse Monarchy Tribally dependent monarchy Low Loyal 
Oman No Collapse Monarchy Mercenaries Low Loyal 
Palestine No Collapse Democracy Independent None Loyal 
Saudi 
Arabia 
No Collapse Monarchy Dual Low Loyal 
Sudan No Collapse Personalist Autocratic officer-politician Low Loyal 
Syria No Collapse Personalist Autocratic officer-politician High Fracture 
Tunisia Collapse Personalist Autocratic officer-politician Intermediate Defect 
Yemen Collapse Personalist Autocratic officer-politician Intermediate Fracture 
 
This paper finds that civil-military relationships are a strong indicator of the 
outcome of the mass protest movements, as it was accurate predictors of the military’s 
willingness or reluctance stand by the regime at high levels of violence. Autocratic 
Officer Politician and Dual militaries are especially susceptible to collapse due to 
structural tendencies that lead to defection and fracturing. Coup-proofing methods, while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The methodology for constructing this table will be discussed in detail in the Methods chapter of this 
paper. 
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effective in staving off coups, actually catalyzed the defection of the military and, 
consequently, the collapse of regimes. 
This analysis is divided into five sections: first, a review of literature relevant to 
autocratic regime stability and civil-military relations; second, an overview of the theory 
and methods used by the author in attempting to unfold the role of civil-military relations 
and violence in the Arab Spring; third, a look at the macro trends in regime and military 
behavior in the Arab Spring; fourth, case studies looking in-depth at day-by-day actions 
of regimes and militaries in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain followed by a comparison of the 
three; and finally, a conclusion linking the macro trends and the case studies, with 
comments on applicability to global protest repression and future research possibilities.
Chapter 2: Research Agenda 
Literature Review 
 To begin why some regimes collapsed following protests while others maintained 
control, it is necessary to understand theories of autocratic regime stability. What 
accounts for the stability of autocratic regimes? While the military may play an important 
role, it is certainly not the only variable that has contributed to nearly 30 years of 
consistent, stable autocratic rule in the MENA region. One of the uniting characteristics 
of the Middle Eastern regimes that experienced Arab Spring protests is authoritarianism, 
so the focus will be on the theories that explain autocratic regime stability, as opposed to 
regime stability more generally. The logic, of course, is that autocracies retain power 
differently than other, more democratic forms of government do. 
Regime Stability 
Economic  
The most common theory that scholars offer is economic in nature. The general 
line of thought is relatively simple: if a regime has money, it is able to appease its citizens 
via cooptation, quelling any desire for regime change. Investment in education, 
infrastructure, jobs, or other improvement that make the citizenry happy can be used. 
Regimes without money, however, are not able to co-opt the population and must instead 
rely on the citizenry’s goodwill, which is less likely to work.  
 Especially with respect to the Arab autocratic regimes, many scholars attribute 
regime stability to cooptation. Sven Behrendt’s work on sovereign wealth funds—
“investment funds that are owned or controlled by national governments”—exemplifies 
	   	   O’Mealia	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this line of thought.9 Behrendt argues that there is relationship between sovereign wealth 
funds in nondemocratic countries and the democratic quality of their institutions. The 
relationship he finds supports the notion that when a leader has a significant amount of 
expendable money, he is able to co-opt potential adversaries within the population. 
Authoritarian regimes are less likely to have transparent sovereign wealth funds, giving 
the autocrat more flexibility in delivering resources to the areas that will be most 
effective for their purposes. In other words, an authoritarian regime that has more control 
over its sovereign wealth fund is able to gain support via bribery. Likewise, O’Reilly 
explores the relationship Omani and Bahraini monarchs share with their oil wealth. He 
argues “the so-called oil monarchs have successfully placated opponents by providing 
their subjects with jobs that pay well and with excellent social services.”10 To O’Reilly, 
then, Oman and Bahrain have been able to co-opt their constituencies with the oil money 
that they have. Other scholars have found similar results. Bueno de Mesquita found that 
leaders with access to resources such as foreign aid or natural resource rentier states are 
best equipped to survive domestic threats. He states that there are two basic methods 
authoritarian leaders can use to ameliorate the threat of revolution with: they can increase 
economic public goods or suppress the oppositions’ ability to organize by restricting 
freedom of speech, assembly and free press. He finds, though, that cooptation is much 
more effective because “leaders find it hard to embark on the suppression response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Behrendt, Sven, "Sovereign Wealth Funds in Nondemocratic Countries Financing Entrenchment or 
Change?" Journal of International Affairs 65 (2011):65  
10 O'Reilly, Marc. "Oil Monarchies without Oil: Omani & Bahraini Security in a Post-Oil Era." Middle East 
Policy 6 (1999): 78.  
 
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   13	  
mass political movements because the economic contraction it causes makes it harder for 
leaders to continue buying their coalitions loyalty.”11 
 Bueno de Mesquita’s argument illustrates a transition from a basic economic 
argument to a thread in the literature that relies on natural resources to explain regime 
stability. The idea that regimes are able to co-opt their constituencies is pretty intuitive, 
so this thread builds upon that notion by introducing the idea of the resource 
blessing/curse. O’Reilly begins to explore the connection oil and regime stability share, 
but scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita and Geddes take this a step further and claim that 
regimes become dependent on specific resources. Geddes finds that “increases in oil 
wealth relative to individual averages increase autocratic survival, not by deterring 
democratization, but by reducing the vulnerability of dictatorships to ouster by groups 
that establish subsequent dictatorships,” which implies “spikes in oil prices reinforce the 
durability of regimes like Iran’s” not because they help guard against democratization, 
but rather because they help ensure that other prospective autocratic rulers do not collect 
enough power to overthrow the regime.12 Thus, Geddes’ findings suggest that oil, and 
implicitly other natural resources can help quell resistance from within the elite, but that 
democratization is an entirely different process. 
Institutions 
 Geddes findings regarding democratization provide a useful bridge to another 
explanation of regime stability that helps fill some of these gaps: institutionalization. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. "Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of 
Government Finance." American Journal of Political Science 54 (2010): 948.  
12 Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival," (2010): 28 
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Institutions can refer to any formalized government structure that helps the regime 
maintain control. The logic with institutionalization follows two paths: first, democratic 
institutions give the regime a veil of legitimacy and second, that the institutions, 
democratic or not, elongate regime life because of the regime’s control over the 
institutions that make society function. 
 Slate and Fenner are a useful example of this line of thought. They argue that the 
state power—which is different from the state itself—can be used to keep authoritarian 
regimes in power in four different ways: coercing rivals, extracting revenues, registering 
citizens and cultivating dependence. The army, for example, an institution that, 
theoretically, at least, only the regime has access to, is a powerful institution for coercing 
and repressing rivals. Taxes, another institution controlled by the regime, can fund public 
services that co-opt citizens. Registering citizens can be used to keep citizens in or out of 
the political process and arena, depending on what is more useful to the regime. Finally, 
like with taxes, autocratic regimes can use state institutions such as government jobs to 
cultivate dependence. The state becomes an institution within itself, which allows the 
authoritarian regime to create a stranglehold on the institutions within it, strengthening 
the regime’s grip on power. When opposition arises, the regime is able to use the state’s 
resources to quell, co-opt or destroy the opposition.13 
 Other scholars have argued that institutions serve authoritarian regimes in a 
legitimizing role. Ezrow and Frantz are especially useful in this respect. Political parties 
and legislatures are common throughout the authoritarian world, they claim, because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Slater, Dan and Sofia Fenner. 2011. "State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and 
Authoritarian Durability." Journal of International Affairs 65 (2011). 
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   15	  
authoritarian regimes rely on them to keep control of the state. “Even when they are weak 
and exert little de facto political power,” the authors explain, “parties and legislatures 
serve a purpose: they prolong the survival of the ruling establishment. Dictatorships with 
parties endure longer than those without them, an effect that is even more pronounced 
when regimes also have legislatures.”14 Their existence serves two purposes according to 
Ezrow and Frantz: first, they give a cloak of democracy, which offers the regime 
legitimacy. Second, preexisting legislatures allow the regime to smoothen leadership 
transitions at the time when when these regimes are most susceptible to collapse. Bunce 
and Wolchik also look at democratic institutions, agreeing that the institutions can be 
manipulated to ensure electoral victory in what they term “competitive autocratic 
elections.”15  
 The theory of institutionalization has significant pushback among scholars, 
however. Wright, for example, compares the Chinese autocracy-by-party with different 
Arab dictatorships and finds the institutionalization of the dictator gives opposition a 
figurehead to attacks. Whereas a dictator is an obvious and well-accepted target when 
things go wrong or people have discontents, the Chinese Communist party is so gigantic 
and convoluted that resistance ultimately fails because they have no one individual to 
blame. Stirring up passion against someone like Gadhafi, though, is much easier than 
turning public anger against a relatively faceless Chinese Communist Party, which is 
opaque and has frequent leadership changes. The institution of the dictator, therefore, can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ezrow, Natasha and Erica Frantz. "State Institutions and the Survival of Dictatorships." Journal of 
International Affairs 65 (2011): 9. 
15 Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist 
Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
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ultimately serve as a destabilizing force. Likewise, Wright argues that democratic 
institutions such as political parties within autocratic states can serve as a destabilizing 
force because of their ability to organize an opposition.16 
Foreign Factors 
In a similar line of thought to the economic factors, scholars have focused 
extensively on how foreign aid affects regime stability. Yom and Gause, for example, 
point out that all of the regimes that have survived the Arab Spring have strong foreign 
patrons. They explain that foreign support is important because “it lowers the cost of 
repression by diminishing any international backlash it might arouse” and “foreign 
patrons can arm local regimes with additional economic and coercive resources.”17 
Foreign aid, therefore, can both directly and indirectly ensure regime stability. The 
United States refusal to criticize Bahrain is illustrative of the indirect effect foreign aid 
can have on autocracies—namely, they can give international credence to the regime and 
ensure that international actors will not aid the regime’s collapse. Moreover, the arrival of 
Gulf Cooperation Council troops (namely, Saudi Arabian troops) in Bahrain helped 
bolster the regime and gave the regime resources it used to crush the protests. Yom and 
al-Momani’s case study of Jordan is also useful in illustrating this line of thought: the 
United States has provided aid to Jordan that had enabled Jordan to push back on 
democratic reforms that were occurring throughout 1989 and then again in the Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Wright, Teresa. 2011. "Perpetuating Communist Party Rule in China." Journal of International Affairs 
65 (1): 31-45.  
17 Yom, Sean and Gregory Gause. 2012. "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang on." Journal of 
Democracy 23 (4). 84.  
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Spring, ensuring the stability of the monarch. However, the Mubarak regime received 
high levels of foreign support both before and at the start of the protests but fell in 
response to Arab Spring protests. 
The autocratic regime stability literature explains—at least in part—how the 
autocratic leaders of Middle Eastern nations were able to so effectively maintain power 
throughout the final quarter of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st, but does not 
address the role that the military plays in states that rely heavily on the security apparatus 
to thwart domestic dissent. Of course, the focus of this paper is on the military’s role in 
regime stability or collapse, so the literature on civil-military relations will now be 
examined. 
Civil-Military Relations 
The scholarship surrounding the relationship of the state and the military is 
expansive. Perhaps the most famous and foundational text is Samuel Huntington’s The 
Soldier and the State. At the core of Huntington’s thesis is the assertion that the world 
militaries have experienced a phenomenon of professionalization, which has resulted in a 
necessary normalization of the relationship military elites share with the civilian control. 
As the military has become more of an permanent institution—as opposed to a set of 
citizens in reserve that can be called into action—the relationship that governments and 
militaries share has taken on increasing significance: the military needs the government’s 
money to function and the government needs the military’s support to avoid overthrow.18 
On the basis of this thesis, multiple studies have looked at the relationships specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 7. 
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regimes share with their respective militaries, highlighting the vastly different ways in 
which militaries interact with their governments.19 As the field grew, scholars moved 
from individual case studies to more general theories of, and trends in, civil-military 
relations. 
 This project is concerned first and foremost with reactions to and effects of 
popular protests within Middle East regimes, so it is imperative that there is a clear 
understanding of the specific dynamics of Middle Eastern civil-military relations. In the 
broadest sense, scholars agree that there have been two distinct phases of civil-military 
relations in the Middle East. Phase one lasted from the 1950s to the early 1970s, when the 
military was the prime challenger to non-democratic governments. Phase two was from 
the 1970s onward, when military was the principal protector of the authoritarian regimes. 
While the scholarship on the first phase is abundant, modern scholarship on the second 
phase of Middle East political-military relations is sparse as the waning of coups has 
decayed interest.20  
Born out of the legacy of the first phase of civil-military relations, the great 
majority of the literature focuses on coup-proofing mechanisms employed by regimes. 
Some common characteristics of coup-proofing include: the use of family and ethnic ties 
in coup-critical positions, the creation of a parallel forces to counter threats, development 
of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdictions so that they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For examples, see: Be'eri, 1970; Haddad, 1965-1973; Hurewitz, 1969; Rustow 1963; Torrey 1964; 
Vatikiotis, 1961; Vatikiotis, 1967 
20 Barak, Oren and Assaf David. 2010. "The Arab Security Sector: A New Research Agenda for a 
Neglected Topic." Armed Forces & Society 36 (5): 804-824.  
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effectively spy on each other, and the cultivation a culture of expertise in the military.21 
22Much scholarship has focused on the effect of coup proofing on military capability, 
usually noting that the military tends to sacrifice some competence in the process.23 
Kamrava’s study of civil-military relations in the Middle East examines the 
professionalization of Middle Eastern militaries, which he argues has greatly enhanced 
the political capital of the militaries, even in those countries that did not experience 
military coups, such as the monarchies.24 The Royal Danish Defence College also 
concluded an exhaustive study of the civil-military relationships in the Middle East in 
2008. It finds that direct seizure of political power by the military is becoming rare in the 
Middle East, as militaries opt instead to exert influence in other ways, especially 
economic ones.25 The Middle Eastern military, therefore, has seen its position in the 
political arena evolve in recent decades from a constant coup threat to a powerful, 
although more conventional, political player.  
 Foreign Policy’s MENA security analyst Steven Cook examined the state of the 
civil-military relationship in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey. Whereas many scholars saw the 
Middle Eastern and North African militaries as agents of progress—economically and 
politically—Cook draws distinctions. When the economy was thriving, he says, this was 
true. “The empirical evidence suggests that military officers in developing countries 
were, indeed, successful in generating significant economic performance and carried out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Horowitz, Donald. 1982. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: University of California Press.  22	  Quinlivan, James. 1999. "Coup Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." 
International Security 24 (2): 131-165.	  
23 For the best examples, see De Atkine (1999) and Powell (2012).  
24 Kamrava, Mehran. 2000. "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East." 
Political Science Quarterly 115 (1): 67 
25 Jensen, Carsten. 2008. Developments in Civil Military Relations in the Middle East. Copenhagen: Royal 
Danish Defence College. 7-8. 
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successful programs of natural infrastructure development.”26 When those economies 
stagnated, however, “the officers became conservative elements clinging tenaciously to 
regimes in which they were (and remain) the primary beneficiaries.”27 The civil-military 
relationship became one of conservatism, with military leaders serving primarily as 
protectors of the regime and not the people.  
Very little has been done to create an understanding of the different trends in civil-
military relationships across regimes, but Kamrava offers the most useful typology. 
Autocratic officer-politicians are former military officers turned civilian leaders. Tribally 
dependent monarchies are monarchies that rely on tribal heritage to staff the upper 
echelons of the military. Dual militaries are militaries that have a regular military that is 
representative of the population but also maintains a separate wing devoted either 
ideologically or tribally to the regime. Independent militaries do not share any significant 
ideological or tribal relationship with the regime. Mercenaries are hired, foreign forces.28 
 Perhaps the most complete treatment of civil military relations in the Arab world 
comes from Risa Brooks’ paper “Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab 
Regimes.” She points out that “coups have become less frequent in the Arab world. 
Nonetheless, although public role differs over time and between regimes, the military 
remains a pivotal constituency in most Arab states.”29 She goes on to argue that, 
especially in Middle East and North African state dynamics, “maintaining its loyalty is 
essential to retaining office, and regimes have used a range of methods to ensure its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Cook, Steven. 2007. Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, 
Algeria and Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 14 
27 Ibid. 
28 Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East." 
29 Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes.  17. 
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backing, or at least its acquiescence” such as, “increasing non-military support by 
cultivating social, economic, and religious groups, courting the high command and 
officer corps with corporate and private benefits; appointing members of specific 
groups—often privileged minorities—to key posts in the armed forces; and preventing 
officers from building a support baser within the military by purging potential opponents, 
monitoring military activity, rotating commands and establishing independent security 
services reporting directly to the presidency or the palace.”30 Coup proofing, therefore, 
has been the foundation of the civil-military relationship in the post-1970 phase of 
MENA civil-military relations. As a result, “on a political level…the armed forces’ 
loyalties lie with the regime rather than with the general population, a democratic system 
or the nation as an abstraction.”31 
Protest Repression 
There is an extensive literature on protest repression, with a general agreement on 
the characteristics of the entrance of violence into the repression equation. As Carey 
explains, there are multiple types of domestic dissent: “peaceful anti-government 
demonstrations, strikes, violent riots, guerrilla warfare and large-scale rebellion” are all 
methods of dissent that can lead the government to a repressive reaction.32 The reactions 
of the governments, naturally, vary across time and space, and there is considerable 
scholarship on how and why governments react the way that they do.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, 9. 
31 Rubin, Barry and Thomas Keaney, eds. 2002. Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy. 
London: Frank Cass. 12. 
32 Carey, Sabine. 2006. "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression." Political Research 
Quarterly 59 (1): 168. 
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 Regan and Henderson, for example, in a study of under-developed nations from 
1979-1992, find that “(1) the level of threat is positively and significantly associated with 
political repression; (2) the level of threat has a greater impact than regime type on the 
likelihood of political repression; and (3) controlling for the level of threat, less 
developed states with intermediate levels of democracies—semi democracies—have the 
highest levels of political repression.”33 Davenport, essentially concurring, finds that 
“regimes not only observe different aspects of political conflict with regard to the degree 
of threat perceived, but they also recognize the need to apply political repression at 
different rates to counter these threats.”34 Moreover, he finds that nondemocratic regimes 
repress at especially disproportionate levels when compared to transitional or democratic 
regimes.35 There thus seems to be some agreement within the literature: regimes respond 
with higher levels of repression when they feel especially threatened and developing, 
nondemocratic regimes are the biggest offenders. Neither finding is particularly 
surprising.  
Gartner and Regan, however, break the consensus with their study of Latin 
American countries. When demands increase in Latin America, they say, government 
repression decreases and when demands decrease, government repression increases.36 
Carey, who offered the different forms of protest, went on to find that among the five 
different forms of threat (demonstrations, strikes, riots, guerrilla attacks and revolutions), 
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only guerrilla attacks increase the probability of repression and that nonviolent 
movements (demonstrations or strikes) or relatively spontaneous (riots) are not responded 
to with high levels of repression.37 Bell et al. find that political violence increases in 
regimes that abuse the physical integrity of their citizens, that violence is especially likely 
to occur in weak states, and that violence increases with access to freedom of assembly 
and widespread access to internet technology.38 Francisco studied the repression-backlash 
dynamic in autocratic regimes, concluding that massacres and other acts of harsh 
repression rarely work, as protests tend to gain speed in the wake of state violence against 
protesters.39 
Next, this paper will develop a theory rooted in these three literatures to analyze 
the role of militaries in dictating the outcome of the Arab Spring protests.
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Theory 
The Arab Spring illuminated gaps in the overlapping literatures described in the 
literature review: first, the current civil-military literature focuses on coup d’états and 
ignores the effect the relationship has on response to mass domestic protest movements. 
Second, theories don’t adequately explain the connection between violence and civil-
military relationships. Third, there is no current analysis of the cause and effect of 
military defection in domestic antigovernment protests. Finally, theories have only 
explored the effect of coup-proofing on a regimes ability in international wars, not to 
repress domestic challenges. The prevailing notion on Arab civil military relations is that 
“on a political level…the armed forces’ loyalties lie with the regime rather than with the 
general population, a democratic system or the nation as an abstraction,” but in certain 
instances the military behaved in ways that totally defied the conventional wisdom.40 
Thus, we are left with many questions without adequate scholarship to address them as 
we attempt to digest the Arab Spring: most importantly, how does the Arab Spring 
challenge the previous understanding of civil-military relations in the MENA region? Has 
the military-political dynamic evolved differently in certain regime types? Were certain 
regime types or civil military relationships more likely to use violence? What caused a 
military to stand by the regime and how did they differ from militaries that defected? Did 
the military actually even have any control over the events, or were they simply reacting 
to them? This paper will attempt to fill the holes in the literature by examining the 
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dynamics of violence, civil-military relations, defection and regime collapse in the Arab 
Spring. 
The main theory that this paper posits is that the civil-military relationships were 
the most important variable in determining the outcome of the protests that swept through 
the Arab world in 2011. If the military was the stabilizing force in Arab politics the last 
three decades, then it is reasonable to believe that they played an instrumental role in the 
destabilization of the regimes. Using Kamrava’s civil-military relations typology, an 
Autocratic Officer Politician civil-military relationship has certain dynamics that yielded 
different responses than a tribally dependent monarchy did, and those differences dictated 
whether the regime was able to survive the challenge or not. The various civil-military 
relationships resulted in different levels of violence and rate of defection, each of 
contributed significantly to the regime’s collapse or survival. On a more specific level, 
this paper will look at the way in which regimes used violence to suppress the protests, 
the role of the military in perpetrating the violence, and the effect of that violence on both 
the regime and the military. In order to examine this theory, the paper will test the follow 
four hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis #1 Regimes that maintained a stronger civil-
military relationship were most likely to 
survive the challenges presented by the Arab 
Spring. 
Hypothesis #2 States that were willing to use violence at high 
levels against protesters were the regimes that 
collapsed, whereas those that did not use 
violence survived the challenge. 
Hypothesis #3 High levels of violence resulted in military 
defection or fracturing, which in turn led to 
state collapse. 
Hypothesis #4 Coup proofing mechanisms played an 
instrumental role in dictating military response 
to the protests. 
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The first hypothesis is one way to restate the thesis that this paper is arguing: that 
the stronger the civil-military relationship, the more likely a regime is to survive a serious 
domestic protest movement. As Desch points out, analysts disagree on what makes for a 
strong civil-military relationship and what makes a weak one.41 Moreover, most people 
think of civil-military relationships in terms of coups, but one “can have poor civil-
military relations without the threat of a coup.”42 The strength of a civil military 
relationship can be measured based on a number of variables. As civil-military relations 
theorist Rebecca Shiff explains, “Nations framed in terms of civil-military relations (good 
or bad) are those that have been encouraged by Western nations to separate civil and 
military spheres.”43 This paper, however, will view “strength” of civil-military in terms 
of loyalty to the regime. How willing, in order words, is the military to defend the 
regime? Is it most loyal to the regime, the population, or some other entity? The strongest 
civil-military relations will be the most loyal to the regime.  
One such variable is by ethnic and tribal loyalty. It perhaps plays into the 
common stereotype about the Middle East and North Africa region that tribal identities 
dictate all politics. But, as Kamrava indicates, military identities are indeed often based 
on tribal loyalties.44 The logic for tribal loyalties being more willing to use violence in 
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response to protests is simply that a tribally based militaries have the most to lose if a 
challenge to the regime is successful. Especially in minority ruled states such as Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia, the loss of power could mean high levels of death in the 
tribal/ethnic/religious group.  
Another example of a measuring stick for the strength of the civil-military 
relationship would be the connection the military feels for the leader of the regime on a 
professional or ideological level.  Many of the autocratic regimes in the Arab world came 
to power from a highly ideological revolutionary movement but moved away from their 
ideology and military roots as the years passed in an effort to consolidate civilian 
control.45 If the ideological drive of the original seizure of power still permeates the 
military, especially at the elite level, one would expect that the connection between the 
military and the leader remains strong. Sticher argues that the age of the regime increases, 
relationships with the elites in the military become solidified, creating an institutional 
level of devotion to the autocratic leader that then is passed throughout the ranks.46 
Coupled with the leader’s position as a former military officer, the extent to which the 
militaries still feel the connection to the leader is an important indicator of the strength of 
the civil military relationship. 
Economic and social position within a society can also be viewed as an important 
measure of the strength of the civil-military relationship. For example, Cook points out 
that many Arab militaries have a significant stake in the national economy, leading to the 	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conclusion that as economies falter, Arab militaries become more conservative and align 
more fully with the regime.47  
The second hypothesis comes out of a relatively established norm in the literature: 
those regimes that use high levels of violence against their citizens tend to collapse 
shortly thereafter. One would expect that this trend continued in the Arab Spring, 
although it presents a problem of causation: do regimes that use high levels of violence 
do so as a last ditch effort to maintain power or does the violence cause the collapse to 
occur by hardening the demands and resolve of the protesters? Unpacking this dynamic is 
essential to understanding of the role of the military in protest repression. It also deals 
with the problem of causation presented by the use of violence regimes in response to 
protests—whereas the first clause only deals with those regimes that use violence, this 
hypothesis offers an explanation for the majority of cases: low to no violence and no 
collapse.  If regimes that use violence harden the demands of the protesters, those that do 
not can be seen as letting the protesters air their complaints and then sputter out.  It is 
possible that other methods, such as cooptation are the reason for the low violence-no 
collapse relationship, but those variables are outside the scope of this paper. 
The third hypothesis builds off of Francisco’s findings that violent repression of 
protests actually has the opposite effect, although it views the relationship from the 
perspective of the military rather than the protesters.48 Francisco’s findings only apply to 
protest size and outcome, though. This hypothesis takes his general finding and applies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cook, Steven. 2008. Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, 
Algeria and Turkey. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. 14 
48 Francisco, Ronald. 2005. "The Dictator's Dilemma." 59.  
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the variable of concern in this paper—militaries—to it: if militaries are the linchpin upon 
which protest movements succeed or fail in the Middle East and the overwhelming trend 
is for state violence to lead to successful protest movements, then the military should 
react negatively to the violence. It is safe to assume that violence, especially when used 
against a domestic audience, would put stress on the military structure. How does this 
stress release itself?   Previous research such as Francisco’s indicate that regimes collapse 
in the face of highly violent protest repression, but as the state institution capable of the 
executing the highest levels of violence, the military becomes the most important 
institution as violence escalates. If the regime has collapsed in previous such movements, 
it would be logical that the collapse occurred when the military either defected or 
fractured, leaving the regime without the resources to finish repressing the protests or the 
protection after having used violence in an attempt to quell the protests. 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis comes out of the extensive coup-proofing literature that 
forms the bedrock of scholarship surrounding civil-military relations. Coup proofing, it 
has been widely noted, is not just an aspect of civil-military relations in Arab autocratic 
states, but the foundation of the relationship. Among the coup-proofing techniques that 
this paper will examine are “increasing non-military support by cultivating social, 
economic, and religious groups, courting the high command and officer corps with 
corporate and private benefits; appointing members of specific groups—often privileged 
minorities—to key posts in the armed forces; and preventing officers from building a 
support baser within the military by purging potential opponents, monitoring military 
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activity, rotating commands and establishing independent security services reporting 
directly to the presidency or the palace.”49  
In Kamrava’s analysis of the dynamics of autocratic officer politician states and 
dual militaries, he notes that volunteer militias are used as a coup-proofing tactic in many 
states (Kamrava 83). They focus mostly on internal security, are highly ideological, and a 
volunteer force, so their willingness to support the regime should be more likely than a 
regular, less ideological force. Mercenaries, another coup-proofing tactic, are 
disconnected from the population, which would lead one to conclude that they would not 
hesitate to use violence if ordered to by their hired bosses. Brooks, De Atkine (1999) and 
Powell (2012) all point to coup proofing as defining the capabilities of Arab militaries 
and civil-military relationships. The intention of some coup-proofing measures is to make 
it so that the military cannot act decisively, so one would expect that such a weakening of 
the armed forces would make it so that the military would struggle when put into action. 
Conversely, the parallel forces would have varying levels of connection to the regime, 
resulting in higher levels of violence from those with a strong connection and a fracturing 
from the rest of the military. Whereas the first three hypotheses looks at behavioral 
trends, this fourth hypothesis provides a structural explanation of why the typologies 
react in the way they do.
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Methodology 
  To test these hypotheses, this paper will use macro-level typologies to gain a 
better understanding of the phenomena that occurred throughout the protests across the 
region. There is still considerable disagreement what happened in the Arab Spring, so this 
data will hopefully provide a clear lens through which to understand, at least on the 
macro level, what occurred. The paper will then grapple with the nuanced web of the 
civil-military relationship, use of state violence, defection and state collapse through case 
studies of Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The methods for both analyses will be explained 
in this section. 
 Table #1 will serve as the basis for the quantitative analysis section of this paper. 
Using typologies for Regime Type, Result of Protests, Civil-Military Relationship, Level 
of Violence, and Military Response, it will cross variables in an attempt to see how each 
interacts and unpack the puzzle of how and why regimes collapsed or survived and the 
role the military played in the collapse or the survival. The various typologies for Table 
#1 were gathered from various sources and required explanation.  
 “Results of protests” are as of January 2013. “Collapse” is defined as a removal of 
the head of state from power. “No collapse” refers to any regime whose head of state 
remains in power after the protests. Thus, although many regimes dissolved Parliaments 
and fired Cabinets, they are categorized as “No Collapse” because the head of state 
remained in power after the protests subsided. This is my own typology, and is relatively 
self-explanatory. 
“Regime type” is according to Geddes typology for autocratic regimes offered in 
her book Paradigms and Sand Castles. Military regimes are “a group of officers decides 
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who will rule and exercises some influence on policy.”50 Personalist “differ from both 
military and single-party in that access to the office and the fruits of the office depend 
much more on the discretion of an individual leaders. The leader may be an officer and 
may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military not the party 
exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.”51 
In Single Party regimes, “a party organization exercises some power over the leader at 
least part of the time, controls the selection of officials, organizes the distribution of 
benefits to supports and mobilizes citizens to vote and show support for party leaders in 
other ways.”52 This is in contrast to regimes “in which the leader himself maintains a near 
monopoly over policy and personnel decisions despite the existence of a support party,” 
which are personalist.53 
“Civil Military Relations” is categorized according to Kamrava’s typology. 
Autocratic officer-politicians are former military officers turned civilians. Tribally 
dependent monarchies are monarchies that rely on tribal heritage to staff the upper 
echelons of the military. Dual militaries are militaries that have a regular military that is 
representative of the population but also maintains a separate wing devoted either 
ideologically or tribally to the regime. Independent militaries do not share any significant 
ideological or tribal relationship with the regime. Mercenaries are hired, foreign forces. I 
only categorize countries under mercenaries if their civil-military relationship is greatly 
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affected by the hiring of mercenaries.54 In Libya, for example, although Gaddafi hired 
mercenaries, they did not have enough of an effect to constitute a mercenary military. He 
offered a civil-military relationship for most countries in his article but I filled in the ones 
that he did not. 
The “level of violence” typology uses the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s PRIO 
database. “Low” indicates a death toll of 1-24, “Intermediate” of 25-999, and “high” of 
1000 or more. “None” is reserved for those countries that experienced Arab Spring 
protests, but did not have any protest related deaths. The death counts are only of those 
citizens killed by the use of state force.55 
The Military Response typology uses Silverman’s analysis of military action in 
the Arab Spring. Loyalty implies that the military did not take any actions or any 
noteworthy actions to aid the protesters. Defection is when the military decides as a 
cohesive unit to side with the protesters. Fracture is when at least one sizable portion of 
the military defects and fights against the loyal state forces on the protesters behalf.56 
These categorizations of the variables are simply the best available for each. 
Although imperfect, they help clarify the larger picture of the phenomenon that was the 
Arab Spring. This paper will cross reference these variables and attempt to clarify the 
role each played in the different outcomes. By “outcomes,” I mean both result of the 
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protest and levels of violence. Level of violence, therefore, will play a dual role in this 
paper as an explanatory variable and an outcome. 
After establishing the overarching trends and macro-level results of the Arab 
Spring, this paper will then hone in on three case studies: Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. 
These cases were chosen because they illustrate cover various typologies in the macro-
level analysis. Micro-level analysis will thus bring to light both the meaning of the data 
and help explain discrepancies within. Egypt and Tunisia are useful case studies because 
they are personalist regimes with autocratic officer politician political-military 
relationships that collapsed after intermediate levels of violence, which is the most 
common formula for collapse in the data set. It is imperative, therefore, to understand the 
common dynamics that accounted for the end result of relatively high violence and 
regime collapse. Bahrain will then be examined because it was the only monarchy to use 
high levels of violence, was the only regime to use Intermediate level of violence and did 
not defect, fracture, or collapse. Together, these case studies illuminate the largest 
questions that Chart 1 asks: what role did the civil-military relationship have in regime 
collapse or stability? What was did violence play? What conditions were necessary for a 
military to defect?  
It is equally as important to explain why I chose to avoid certain cases as well. 
Syria, for example, based on the macro-data, seems like an interesting and important case 
study. Indeed, it would be and defies the norm within the data personalist regimes with 
autocratic officer-politician civil-military relationships with higher levels of violence 
should collapse. At the time of this writing, however, the conflict in Syria is very much 
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   35	  
ongoing. The situation in Syria has devolved into civil war, and there is no way to tell 
how it will turn out. Simply put, at the time of this writing, I could write an analysis 
based on current circumstances in Syria that may be rendered totally irrelevant tomorrow. 
It is impossible, therefore, to definitively analyze the long-term impacts of civil-military 
relations in Syria. By our definition of “collapse” and “no collapse” we must treat Syria 
as a not collapsed regime, but it is too early to draw conclusions from the conflict. Libya, 
likewise, will not be examined because of the United States’ involvement in the conflict. 
It is now impossible to know if the Gadhafi regime would have been able to successfully 
repress the dissent without foreign intervention, and thus impossible to paint a clear 
picture of the civil-military, violence and collapse dynamic. While GCC troops entered 
Bahrain to help quell the protests, they did not have a significant effect on the outcome or 
drastically change the makeup of the military, as the Bahraini military was largely based 
on mercenaries before the protests began. The same cannot be said for the entrance of 
international force into Libya, as it very much affected the outcome of the conflict.  
The Egyptian coup-d’état of 2013 that overthrew President Morsi is also not 
included in this paper. The main thrust of the analysis in this paper looks at the 
relationship between militaries and their long-term autocratic rulers. No such relationship 
existed between President Morsi and the Egyptian military, and therefore its inclusion 
would not add anything to the data or analysis other than to dilute the unique 
circumstances of the Arab Spring protests.  
This paper will not examine the civil-military relationship of states that did not 
use violence. As was explained in the literature review, there is an expansive discussion 
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   36	  
within Political Science about how Arab regimes have maintained power. Possibilities 
include cooptation, foreign aid, and tradition, among many others. This paper, however, 
is concerned with primarily with the military and violence. As such, countries that did not 
call on their militaries to play an active role in protest suppression and responded to the 
protests by means other than violence will not be analyzed other than via their inclusion 
in the data. There was no regime that used no or low violence and collapsed, so it is safe 
to assume for the purposes of this paper that these regimes dealt with the dissent in other 
ways that did not involve the civil-military dynamic. As such, they fall outside the 
purview of this paper. 
The case studies will use news and international human rights reports to attempt 
to understand the actions of militaries and the development of violence in the various 
conflicts on a day-by-day basis. Internal military memos and other such historical 
material is not publicly available (at least yet), and given the time-constraints of an 
undergraduate thesis, it is impossible to wait for them to become available. With the 
amount written on the Arab Spring and the attention paid to each case, though, there is 
ample material from which to draw conclusions about the actions or inaction of militaries 
as well as the onset and escalation of violence. Such methods do present their own 
constraints, however. I do not speak Arabic or any of the more local dialects and 
therefore did not have access to more direct resources. Although the Arab Spring sparked 
a massive media interest, access was limited and coverage imperfect. This is especially 
the case in Tunisia, the first site of protests, which left Western media playing catch-up. 
Every attempt is made to piece together the fullest picture, but imperfection in the 
information is inevitable. Moreover, this qualitative analysis will be supplemented by 
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data from an ongoing project by Quinn Mecham and Tyler McArthur at Bringham Young 
University that is compiling data on daily protest repression and size for each Arab 
Spring country. As the project is not yet complete, certain variables are not yet available 
for some countries. Nonetheless, the data helps visualize the use violence across time. 
They use a threshold coding system. For Protest size, the coding is: 1is less than 1,000; 2 
is between 1,000 and10,000; 3 between 10,000 and100,000; 4 is between 100,000 and 
1,000,000; and 5 is greater than 1,000,000. For deaths, 1 is less than 10 deaths per day, 2 
is between 10 and 50, 3 is between 50 and 100, 4 is between 100 and a 1,000, and 5 is 
greater than 1,000.57 This data will allow the author to illustrate trends in violence over 
time visually and, when cross-analyzed with the day-by-day military actions, will show 
the dynamics of violence, civil-military relations, defection and regime collapse. 
Although the macro-data only categorizes by deaths (due to the fact that they are 
the most readily available and reliable statistics), the case studies will attempt to piece 
together violent government actions of all kinds, even non-lethal. These can include 
beatings, physical intimidation, and displays of force, among others.58  
Together, the qualitative and quantitative analyses will provide insights into both 
the overarching trends of military action in the Arab Spring (who sided with the regime 
or the protesters? what role did violence play in dictating that role?) and why did the 
military act as they did (why did they defect or remain loyal? Why did they use or refuse 
to use violence?). 	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Many of the analyses of the Arab Spring have focused on regime type for the 
various outcomes, especially noting how resilient Arab monarchies were to the Arab 
Spring.59 Certainly, as Graph #1 illustrates, regime was an important indicator of regime 
collapse or stability. On the X-Axis, regime types are divided by protest outcome: on the 
left are regimes that collapsed and on the right are regimes that survived the challenge. 
Graph #1: Protest Outcome and Regime Type 
What is most readily apparent in Graph #1 is that Personalist regimes are the only 
regimes to have collapsed. In this sense, the scholarly discussion to this point is correct: 
regime type has mattered. That dictatorial Personalist regimes collapse coincide with 
Wright’s findings that dictatorial regimes tend to fare less well when faced with serious 
challenges as they have a specific, easily identifiable target (the dictator).60 That 
Democracies and Military regimes did not collapse also supports her notion that without 
a figurehead target, protest movements are less likely to succeed. Importantly, though, 
only 4 out of 6 Personalist regimes collapsed in the Arab Spring protests. This would lead 
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to the conclusion that regime type is not the key variable in protest outcome throughout 
the Arab Spring, as there was significant variation within the only variable that had any 
collapses. Moreover, Wright’s assertion that a figurehead target leads to higher success 
rates in popular protests is countered by this chart as monarchies, which provide a very 
definitive figurehead, saw 6 regimes not collapse and none collapse. 
 Perhaps what Graph #1 illustrates best is that survival remained the standard 
despite the numerous challenges to regimes in the Arab Spring; it is regime collapse that 
remains the outlier. The vast majority (77.777%) of regimes did not collapse. Only 
Personalist regimes fell, but only 66.66% of Personalist regimes collapsed. Put 
differently, a full one-third of Personalist regimes survived the protests. While the media 
attention may have portrayed the Arab Spring as a changing of the guard in the Middle 
East, Graph #1 indicates that the stability that is so prevalently noted throughout the 
literature remains the standard in the MENA region. This begs the question: what was it 
that moved Personalist regimes from the norm of stability to the exception that is 
collapse? 
 The theory that this paper is testing is that the civil-military relationship was the 
linchpin upon which stability rested in the Arab Spring. As such, Graph #2 demonstrates 
the relationship between civil-military relations and protest outcome, indicating that the 
military plays a critical role in the varying outcomes across the Arab Spring. On the X-
axis, civil-military relations are broken down according to Kamrava’s typology, while the 
Y-axis scales the number of regimes that experienced each outcome. The blue bars 
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indicate regime collapse while the red bars indicate that the regime survived the 
challenge. 
Graph #2: Civil-Military Relations and Protest Outcome 
	  
 Graph #2 is quite similar to Graph #1: collapses are concentrated in Autocratic 
Officer Politician Regimes just as they were in Personalist dictatorships. There is 
significant overlap between the two typologies, as Personalist regimes in the MENA 
region are largely a product of the string of coups from the mid-1900s and therefore are 
rooted in their relationship with the military. A Dual military (Libya) also fell, showing 
that variation was more existent in the Arab Spring than a simple regime-type analysis 
would indicate. Dual militaries are structured to correct for competing factions with 
varying levels of loyalty to the regime. Given a mass protest, such an organizational 
structure would predictably fracture, putting the regime in an especially precarious 
position. Mercenaries, Independent, and Tribally Dependent civil-military relation 
regimes were entirely resistant to the forces of the Arab Spring. 
 From this analysis, it is difficult to decipher how the role of civil-military 
relations differs from that of regime type. Both have highly concentrated proportions of 
regime collapse within one or two types and a majority of classifications 
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indistinguishable from each other. The role of the civil-military relationship, therefore, 
cannot yet be confirmed as the linchpin upon which protest outcome rests.  
The third variable this paper will test is violence, with the understanding that the 
violence should be reflective of the civil-military relationship. If a regime shares an 
especially strong relationship with its military, it could be assumed that the military 
would be more likely to use violence against protesters in an attempt to protect the 
regime. Graph #3 illustrates the effect that violence shares with collapse.  
Graph #3: Violence and Protest Outcome 
This graph shows the strongest correlation of any of the three variables thus far 
reviewed (chi-square test: .00939). Every regime that used lower levels of violence 
remained stable, whereas those that used Intermediate or High levels of violence had a 
high probability of collapsing (66%). The only “high” use of violence that has not yet 
collapsed is Syria, which taken out of the data because of the ongoing conflict there 
would result in a 80% collapse rate for countries using Intermediate or High levels of 
violence. Unsurprisingly, every country that used relatively low levels of violence 
survived the challenge. 
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 Although this violence and collapse relationship is a very tight one, it also 
presents a causation problem. Does higher violence lead to state collapse? Or do states 
use higher levels of violence when they see their security threatened, and therefore they 
use any last ditch options in a futile effort to elongate their rule? Although this data on 
violence does point to a strong correlation between violence being linked to state 
collapse, it is impossible to tell in which direction this relationship runs and the dynamic 
the escalation in violence shares with state collapse. The violence is clearly a driving 
force in the outcome and we must come to a better understanding of why certain regimes 
use violence in such un-proportional ways while others do not.   
 Again, this paper posits that, as the governmental body that has the greatest 
coercive capacity, the military is the key accompanying variable in protest suppression. 
When we cross the civil-military relationship with violence, we can begin to see how the 
different militaries used violence and tease out how the civil-military relationship plays 
into the strong correlation that violence and collapse share, as displayed in Graph #4.   
Graph #4: Civil military relations and violence 
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What is immediately striking is that it is the Autocratic Officer Politician military-
political relationship that yields that highest level of violence, not a military that is 
ethnically based. Logically, the assumption would be that a challenge to an ethnically 
based civil-military relationship would yield the most aggressive reaction from the 
military, as their ethnically based position in society would be most fragile. However, the 
opposite appears true: tribally dependent monarchies used exclusively low levels of 
violence. That Independent militaries used exclusively low levels of violence is 
predictable. Independent militaries by definition represent the population and function 
with a level of impartiality.  
 Autocratic Officer-Politicians were by far the most likely to use higher levels of 
violence and every AOP regime used at least Low violence.  Although one would expect 
tribal loyalties to yield the highest violence, the leader who is being challenged in AOP 
came out of the military, so the military would presumably consider him an ally and use 
excessive force in an effort to protect him. AOPs did not, however, tend to escalate to 
past the High threshold, settling instead with Intermediate levels of violence. There is, 
however, some deviation in the Autocratic-Officer Politician civil-military relationship, 
as two of the six AOPs that saw protesters challenge the regime responded with low 
levels of violence.  
It is again Autocratic Officer Politician civil-military relationships that are the 
most stimulating. Given the previously established connections that violence and regime 
collapse share and the willingness of AOPs to use violence, we see two simultaneous 
trends evolving: first, that AOPs are the most susceptible to state collapse and second, 
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that they can still be effective in suppressing the protesters. In order to examine this, we 
can triple cross variables. In order to do so, Graph #5 crosses civil-military relationships 
and state collapse for only those regimes that used High and Intermediate levels of 
violence. We could do another for those that used No and Low levels of violence, but the 
previous analysis already tells us that there will be no regime collapse. Chart #2 
demonstrates the relationship that civil-military relations and collapse share in lower 
levels of violence effectively, albeit not visually. 
Graph #5: Civil Military Relations and State Collapse in Intermediate-High 
Violence  
	  
Table #2: Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with No-Low Violence 
 Autocratic Officer-Politician Dual Mercenaries Independent 
Tribally 
Dependent 
Collapse      
No Collapse 3 2 1 3 3 
 
The AOP relationship is again the civil-military relationship that immediately 
catches the eye. When coupled with relatively high levels of violence, AOP regimes can 
be seen as extremely susceptible to collapse. The divide between AOP’s that used higher 
violence and those that used lower violence is stark: whereas 100% using low levels of 
violence remained stable, 75% of those that used higher levels of violence collapsed. The 
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outlying AOP that did not collapse is, again, Syria, which is in a prolonged civil war. If 
Syria were not included, therefore, it would be a clear-cut relationship: AOP regimes that 
use relatively high levels of violence are unable to survive challenges. All AOPs other 
than Syria and Libya used Intermediate levels of violence, so the relationship can also be 
analyzed differently, seeing it as Syria shows the correct formula for regime survival in 
AOP regimes where violence has escalated: a large scale use of truly overwhelming force 
while avoiding international intervention.  
Due to the small sample size in the data set with mercenary militaries, it is 
impossible to draw any legitimate conclusions from this breakdown. Likewise, the data 
for Dual militaries is limited, but the resistance of low-violence Dual militaries when 
compared to high-violence Dual military indicates that they are not well suited to respond 
to highly violent domestic situations, as their structure intentionally encourages varying 
levels of loyalty to the regime. 
Graph #4 and Chart #2 indicate that the variable most predictive of regime 
collapse is violence. This finding would concur with Francisco, who found that violence 
is not an effective method of repression. Indeed, across regime types, only those that used 
high levels of violence collapsed, whereas there were different civil-military relationships 
that saw collapse. Given these takeaways, one might conclude that the civil-military 
relationship was not actually the linchpin of regime stability, but when treated for high 
levels of violence, the importance of the civil military relationship becomes clear. The 
AOP relationship is the most susceptible to collapse in the face of the face of violence. 
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Dual militaries also appear to struggle while Mercenaries appear resilient to level of 
violence.  
The next intellectual step, then, would be to ask what happens to the militaries in 
the face of higher levels of violence? If violence is used, presumably the military is 
attempting to protect the regime. Why, then, would the higher levels of violence lead to 
regime collapse? Another variable needs to be added into the equation. Table #1 attempts 
to unpack this puzzle through Defection for Intermediate and High levels of violence, 
bridging the divide between levels of violence, civil military relations and regime 
collapse.  
Table #3: Defection and Regime Collapse 
 Defect Loyal Fracture 
Collapse Egypt, Tunisia   Libya, Yemen 
No Collapse  Bahrain Syria 
The first and most important finding from Table #1 is that all regimes that 
collapsed either saw their militaries Defect or Fracture. Whereas high levels of violence 
had a very strong relationship collapse, Defection is almost causational. The only regime 
that saw the military Defect or Fracture and did not collapse was Syria, which, like with 
levels of violence, must be understood in the context of the ongoing civil war. 
The clear outlier in this table is Bahrain, whose military remained loyal to the 
regime throughout the protests. It is also an outlier in that it is the only predominantly 
mercenary army and monarchy in the subset of countries that experienced higher levels 
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of violence. That a mercenary army would remain loyal is logical, as they are the paid to 
come in and do the dirty work and would not be deterred by killing their countrymen or 
domestic political calculus. 
 Table #2 also begs the question of what is the difference, practically speaking, 
between Fracturing and Defecting on regime collapse. While Defection seemed to 
guarantee collapse (which makes sense logically as the government would not have a 
large enough coercive apparatus to counter a defection by the regular military), that 
Fracturing produces such one sided outcomes is more surprising. Moreover, with the 
ongoing nature of Syria’s conflict, the balance might continue to shift towards collapse if 
tides turn against the Assad regime.  
 If the consequence of defection is collapse and there is already an established, 
highly correlated relationship between regime collapse and violence, then the next 
question would be how defection and violence interact. Graph #6 examines the 
relationship these two variables share. 
Graph #6: Defection and Violence 
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 Graph #6 directs us to two important takeaways: first, that high levels of violence 
appear only when fracturing occurs and second, that at an Intermediate level of violence, 
militaries tend to become so strained that the organization’s structure either turns entirely 
away from the regime or crumbles from within. The difference between the Defection 
and Fracturing, therefore, can be seen in escalation, not outcome: simply, more deaths 
result from Fracturing than from Defection.  
Intermediate levels of violence produced two defections (Tunisia and Egypt), one 
fracture (Yemen), and loyalty in Bahrain. Interestingly, if a military was going to defect, 
it did so before the violence escalated to High. There were no defecting militaries once 
the High threshold of violence had been crossed; only those that fractured experienced 
high levels of violence.  
 The concentration of high levels of violence entirely in Fracturing points to 
another causation problem. Does the military fracture, leading to high levels of violence, 
or does the violence lead the military to fracture, which perpetuates an ongoing cycle of 
escalating violence? If the Intermediate levels of violence indicate anything, it is that it is 
a combination of the two: militaries fracture as a result of Intermediate levels of violence 
and the fracturing escalates the violence. Such a conclusion makes sense given that the 
state coercive apparatus goes from being the only highly armed actor to having a foil that 
is either as armed and trained or only slightly less so. The Defection-Intermediate 
relationship points to the conclusion that fracturing is what leads to higher levels of 
violence, as defection occurs before the violence reaches the High threshold. Presumably 
fracturing and defection would occur at similar points in the conflict. 
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The decision to defect and the fracturing point back to the variable that this paper 
is most interested in, the civil-military relationship. In what way did the civil-military 
relationship relate to defections, fracturing, and loyalty? Graph #7 illustrates this 
relationship. 
Graph #7: Civil-Military Relations and Defection 
	  
Every Autocratic Officer Politician state either Defected or Fractured at higher 
levels of violence, helping solve the problem outlined in the analysis of Graph #5: why, if 
we accept the notion that the military is essential to the survival of the regime and there is 
a relatively high level of violence, would we see regimes collapse? Wouldn’t the 
relatively high levels of violence indicate the support of the military and consequently 
survival of the regime? What Graph #6 tells us is that the civil-military relationship in 
AOP relationships cannot withstand escalating levels of violence, as the military either 
will Defect wholesale or Fracture. The close kinship that AOP’s share with their leader, 
therefore, can be viewed as supportive until violence enters into the equation, at which 
point they begin to crumble. 
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The AOP divide between Defection and Fracture is curious, leaving one to 
question what leads to the different outcome in the same civil-military relationship 
dynamic. Although the data does not give us any sense of why the divergence occurs, we 
can deduce that the more nuanced structures of the militaries were likely to create 
different reactions within the military. If a regime coup-proofed by creating parallel 
divisions, for example, and gave preference to one, a fracture would be likely.61 If a 
regime coup-proofed through weakening the political influence and military capabilities 
of the military, on the other hand, a defection would be more likely to occur. This paper 
will attempt to understand the military calculus to defect in the Case Studies section, as 
there is no way to come to a proper understanding through the typologies in Table #1. 
Unsurprisingly, Dual militaries exclusively fractured. Their very structure is 
designed to create different levels of loyalty to the regime, and when called on to use 
violent action to repress a domestic protest movement, it is predictable that some would 
defect to the protesters. Likewise, the loyalty of Mercenaries in the case of Bahrain is 
precisely the expected result. By removing the relationship between military and the 
population entirely, Mercenaries are less likely to defect than a more domestically 
recruited military would be. Moreover, their career choice as a mercenary points to the 
fact that they sign up to be a soldier, not to protect the nation, state, population, or any 
other abstraction that might drive a domestic military. 
With all of the variables in Table #1 examined and their interaction shown, what 
can we take away about the importance of the civil-military relationship in the repression 	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of the Arab Spring protests and regime stability? The takeaways from the quantitative 
analysis can be divided into general categories: the role of violence, defection, and civil-
military relations.  
First, it is clear that violence has a very important effect on regime stability 
throughout the Arab Spring, as only the regimes that saw violence at higher levels 
collapsed. Whether this is a result of seriousness of the challenge or difference in tactics 
between regimes, violence was clearly a catalyst for regime change in the Arab Spring. 
Nonetheless, Hypothesis #2, which theorized that high levels of violence would lead to 
regime collapse, is partially confirmed, but there is enough variation within the data so 
that it is not fully confirmed. The military only became a relevant variable when levels of 
violence passed the Low threshold. Defections and collapses were non-existent at levels 
below Intermediate, indicating that the military only became an actor as violence 
escalated. Hypothesis #3, which asserted that militaries would fracture or defect under the 
stress of high levels of violence, appears to be true. 
Second, the effect of civil-military relations on regime stability in the Arab Spring 
becomes important when violence escalates to Intermediate and High levels. When 
crossed only with regime collapse, it is clear that AOP and Dual regimes are the most 
likely to collapse, but there were plenty of regimes that remained stable under the AOP 
typology. When honing in on the regimes that used Intermediate or High levels of 
violence, however, the effect of civil-military relations becomes much clearer: AOPs are 
extremely susceptible to defection at high rates of violence and Dual militaries are likely 
to fracture. Mercenaries are likely to stand by their employers. Hypothesis #1, which 
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claimed that the strength of the civil-military relationship dictated the outcome of the 
protest movement, is partially confirmed.  
Third, the highest levels of violence were exclusively perpetuated by Dual 
militaries that fractured. The two civil-wars (Libya and Syria) were both a result of this 
scenario, although their unique circumstances (international intervention in Libya, 
ongoing conflict in Syria) make it impossible to draw many definitive conclusions about 
the highest levels of violence. Yemen did not escalate to High violence, indicating that 
there is the possibility not to devolve into civil-war as a Dual military, but it stands in 
opposition of the two much deadlier cases. 
Fourth, the violence-defection relationship helps correct for the variance in civil-
military relations and collapse. As was pointed out when analyzing Graph #1, survival 
was the norm in the Arab Spring protests across virtually all regime types. Only those 
regimes that experienced higher levels of violence were susceptible to defection. While 
this may indicate that the civil-military relationship is unimportant in regime types such 
as Monarchies and Military governments, this analysis indicates that they would be put 
under increased stress at higher levels of violence should the regime be forced to repress 
another mass protest. Again, Hypothesis #3 is confirmed.  
This chapter has found that civil-military relationship did dictate the outcome of 
the protests at high levels of violence. As violence reached higher levels, defection was 
prevalent amongst AOP and Dual military regimes, leading to collapses. Where defection 
or fracturing occurred, regimes tended to collapse, the only outlier being Syria. It also 
found that there was not a significant difference between defections and fracturing on the 
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outcome, other than an escalation in violence where fracturing occurred. It also found 
that the civil-military relationship had no effect on the outcome of protests in countries in 
which violence was kept to low levels.  
The qualitative analysis could not test Hypothesis #4, which grapples with the 
effects of coup proofing on military action, as it was not captured in any of the variables. 
As such, it will have to be tested quantitatively in Chapter #4. Moreover, while we know 
that higher levels of violence stressed the civil-military relationship to the point of 
defection or violence, we do not know what about the civil-military collapsed. What 
made the AOPs so susceptible? This question must also be left for the case studies. 
This paper will now turn to three case studies to examine the dynamics uncovered 
in this quantitative chapter. Each case study will look at the nuances of the specific civil-
military relationship and then examine government violence on daily basis. Special 
attention will be paid to the role that the military plays in the violence and the buildup to 
defection or successful repression. 
	  
Chapter	  #4:	  Case	  Studies	  
Egypt:	  Reluctant	  Defectors	  
Throughout Egypt’s modern history, stability has been the norm. It is one of the 
few Arab states to have transferred power peacefully: Gamal Abdel Nasser handed the 
reigns to Anwar Sadat in 1970 and, although Sadat was assassinated, his vice president, 
Hosni Mubarak, took over took over in a relatively smooth transition in 1981 given the 
circumstances.62Although coup plots and assassinations threatened all three leaders, they 
were put down with relative ease.63 Until the Arab Spring protests, Mubarak’s 
stranglehold on power was secure.  This was, at least in part, because of the military’s 
position within Egyptian society under all three modern-era regimes.  
All three of modern era Egyptian presidents were former military officers. More 
importantly though, including at outbreak of the Arab Spring protests, “the senior officers 
are the direct descendants of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers who built the 
Egyptian regime,” and thus connected via ideological lineage to the rulers.64 The military 
is also heavily invested in the Egyptian economy: analyst estimate that the military 
controls somewhere between 15% and 40% of the Egyptian economy, a hefty sum on the 
low end and an outstanding sum on the high end. Mubarak relied heavily on security 
forces and the military to sustain his authoritarian rule, with a state of emergency in place 
since the Sadat’s assassination.65 The military has been called on repeatedly to put down 
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movements, especially those of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.66 
Mubarak made sure to keep the military funded as a method of buying its loyalty: Egypt 
is one of the top recipients of US military aid, has access to advance weapon systems and 
training, and integrated it into an economic power.67 
It has therefore always been considered in the interest of the military to maintain 
the status quo. The military was heavily invested in the economy and was well treated by 
the regime, but the protests across Egypt in January and February of 2011 saw the 
military abandon the regime and side with the protesters. As the data showed, Egypt saw 
intermediate levels of violence, indicating that there was some organized repression of 
the protests. As such, the point at which Egyptian military defected becomes important. 
Did they defect in response to the violence or did they defect prior to the violence? Did 
they defect when the violence proved ineffective? The following section will go day-by-
day looking at the use violence via news reports, focusing on who perpetuated the 
violence, when, and what role the military played in the greater struggle over Egypt’s 
future from the outset of the protests until Mubarak’s collapse.  
January 25th 
The first real day of protest came on January 25th, in which thousands of 
Egyptians took to the Tahrir Square in a “day of rage.” There was some violence, but the 
military was uninvolved. Instead, the police took the lead in attempting to stifle the 
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challenge by firing rubber bullets, using teargas and wielding batons.68 Ironically, it was a 
national holiday to commemorate the police forces.69 Other protests also occurred in 
Alexandria, Suez, Mansura, and Beni Suef, with police also taking the lead in containing 
those movements.70 
January 26th & January 27th 
The next two days of protests saw much of the same in terms of protest 
repression: police were again the main source of violence and the main vehicle of the 
government’s response. Plainclothes police and riot teams were dispatched to break up 
the protests, arresting and beating many protesters.7172 Large-scale protests occurred in 
both Suez and Cairo. 
January 28th 
January 28th was the first real escalation in the situation. After protesters ignored a 
curfew imposed by Mubarak on the 27th, the regime deployed the nation’s military for the 
first time since the protests began. Reuters reported more than 20 military vehicles, 
including tanks, moving into Tahrir Square around midnight and troops being deployed 
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into urban areas across the country to attempt to control the escalating protests.73 Forces 
were also deployed in other cities experiencing turmoil, such as Suez. 
Violence continued throughout the day, but still between police and protesters, 
not the military.74 Instead, the military was greeted with relative calm and was welcomed 
to the protest areas.75 The military was present, but did “not interfere in the 
confrontations between police and protesters.”76 
The most serious violence of the day—and indeed, of the week so far—was in 
Suez. Protesters exchanged fire with policemen with guns they stole from a police station 
that was later burnt down.77 Similar confrontations continued with escalating severity in 
Assuit and Cairo. As police and protesters battled, the military interjected itself as a 
temporary buffer between the two parties.78 
January 29th 
President Mubarak gave a speech a little after midnight dismissing his cabinet and 
reaffirming that he would not run for reelection but refusing to step down from the 
presidency, leading protests to continue unabated.79 The army stated that “anyone who 
breaks curfew will be in danger,” but they still refused to step in to break up clashes 
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between protesters and police forces.80 The crowd reached tens of thousands in Cairo, the 
largest so far in the protests. BBC described the atmosphere between the military and the 
demonstrators as “friendly,” while the Washington Post explained that the military 
“smiled and shook hands with protesters and invited them up onto their tanks.”81 
Meanwhile, the violence continued to escalate. At least 45 people died between 
the 28th and 29th according to the Health Ministry and Dr. Sayyed at the Sayyed Galal 
Hospital in Cairo reported more than 20 bullet wounds, often in the head.82 The New 
York Times characterized the night as “an all-out war against hundreds of thousands of 
protesters who flooded the street” by police officers.83 Later in the day, the police 
withdrew from the cities, leaving protesters with the military.84 
The military, despite being dispatched for a full 24 hours and surrounded by 
violent clashes, remained inactive.  
January 30th 
January 30th was a relatively quiet day in terms of actual protests, but the busiest 
in terms of political maneuvering, especially with the military. President Mubarak met 
with the high command of the military: Defense Minister Hohamed Hussein tantawi, 
Chief of Staff Sami a-Anan and other senior commanders attended the meeting that was, 
of course, noted widely by both Egyptian state media and independent media covering 	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the developing situation.85 This cooperation was in stark contrast to the situation that had 
been unfolding on the streets over the past few days—whereas the military brass was 
sitting at the table with Mubarak, the military regulars were standing with the protesters. 
The day remained relatively calm throughout, but the military did show its teeth at 
certain points. The military presence was increased in Cairo and F-16 fighter jets flew 
over the protests at low altitudes, although they still made no direct attempt to disperse 
the protest.86  
January 31st 
January 31st saw the military make its most public and pointed statement to date 
on its role in the ongoing political tension in the country. A uniformed military 
spokesman, speaking on state television said that “the armed forces will not resort to use 
of force against our great people,” essentially reaffirming the position that the actions of 
the military thus far had indicated.87 The security police were redeployed, though, ahead 
of the “million person marches” called for in Cairo and Alexandria for the next day.88 
February 1st 
The “million person march” lived up to its billing, as huge crowds poured into 
Cairo, Alexandria and other cities to continue their calls for the end of the Mubarak 
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regime. The protests remained peaceful throughout the day.89 When President Mubarak 
gave a speech explaining that he would step down from power in September, however, 
the festive atmosphere soured, leading to a tumultuous next day.  
February 2nd  
On the heels of Mubarak’s defiant speech and with increased anger among the 
protesters, pro-Mubarak forces entered Tahrir Square and the most violence since the 
start of the protests in Egypt ensued. The crowds supporting the regime unloaded off 
buses in what appeared to be a well-coordinated attack at exactly 2:15pm.90 They used 
“clubs, rock, knives and firebombers in a concerted assault on thousands of 
antigovernment protesters in Tahrir.”91 Anti-Mubarak protesters struck back using similar 
tactics after the initial onslaught by Mubarak supporters.92  
This left the military in the middle of an escalating conflict. They remained 
stationed in Tahrir, but “neither stopped the violence nor attacked the protesters.”93 
Reports of the military firing into the air were common and moving tanks in an attempt to 
shield the two forces from each other, but that was the extent of the reported attempts to 
break up the fighting.94 It was ineffective and casualties were seen on both sides.95 The 
military’s maintained a posture of inaction, refusing to either protect the protesters or 
repress them. The inaction to this point is telling in that while they were willing to say 	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they would not fire on the protesters, they also would not take any proactive measures to 
protect them from police violence.  
February 3rd-7th  
Protests continued on the third and the fourth, although violence was not nearly as 
pronounced as it was on the 2nd. There was gunfire aimed at anti-government 
demonstrators that left at least five dead, although it was unclear who fired the shots.96 
The 4th was termed “Day of Departure,” and the protest was relatively peaceful.97 
February 5th was also relatively calm on the protest front, but the military made its 
first real headlines as they prepared to clear the Tahrir Square for traffic.98 It was not a 
violent episode, but spoke to their new role as de facto police, including traffic police. 
There were still no incidents of military violence against the population.  
As the army continued to prepare to reopen the country’s economy, reports 
indicated that they fired shots into the air again and moved armored vehicles in an 
attempt to clear protesters from Tahrir Square.99100 The 7th also remained status quo, with 
protesters refusing to leave the square but no reported violence. 
February 8th 
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February 8th saw an escalation in protest activity, with a large sit in at Parliament 
and a rejuvenated crowd after a powerful interview with Google executive and prisoner 
Wael Ghonim aired.101 Cairo and Alexandria both saw their largest protests to date 
without any significant violence reported.102  
February 9th 
The 16th and penultimate day of protests saw a spike in violence, again with 
police forces. In Al-Wadi al-Jadid, reports of violent clashes throughout the day with 
protesters were confirmed across news outlets, in which the police fired upon and killed 
demonstrators and set a gas station on fire.103 The army fired shots into the air in Tahrir 
again attempting to disperse protesters, but otherwise remained on the periphery as the 
crowds grew with the influx of labor unions.104 
February 10th  
With rumors of Hosni Mubarak’s impending resignation, the mood and actions 
throughout the day were generally jubilant.105 No violence was reported, and military was 
told the protesters “everything you want will be realized.”106 Uncertainty and rumors 
ruled the afternoon and early night. 
When President Mubarak went on state television and said—in a speech that was 
anticipated to be his resignation speech—that he intended to remain in power, Tahrir 	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Square erupted with anger. They did not, however, erupt in violence, and the military 
remained as an observer and refrained from using force.107 
February 11th and subsequent days 
On the 18th day of protests, Mubarak was overthrown in what has since been 
recognized as a “bloodless coup,” only a few hours after his surprising and defiant speech 
the night before. Power was transferred to the military to guide the country towards 
democracy—what we now know as a failed experiment after another coup—but the 
overall celebrations remained peaceful and joyous.108  
As the country moved past Mubarak’s resignation, the military was able to clear 
the protests areas and return the country to some semblance of normalcy without having 
to exert force, thus bringing an end to their role as protest policers in this wave of 
protests. 
Analysis 
According to Amnesty International, “at least 840 people were killed and 6,000 
were injured mostly by police and other security forces during the 25 January Revolution 
that forced President Hosni Mubarak to leave office.”109 As an AOP regime with a strong 
interest in the status quo, the military’s loyalty to the Mubarak regime would seem a 
given: losing Mubarak would mean losing a close ally who channeled money, arms, and 
training throughout the ranks. When the Tunisian military defected and sent Ben Ali 	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fleeing, Steven Cook said, “Had Ben Ali followed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, 
who has always taken great care to make sure that the Egyptian armed forces were well-
resourced, General Ammar and his fellow officer may have thought twice about tossing 
their sugar daddy overboard.”110 The military did, however, “toss their sugar daddy 
overboard.” What explains the discrepancy in the seemingly strong civil-military 
relationship and the weak response to the protests?  
The day-by-day analysis of the protests shows that the military was not the arbiter 
of violence throughout the 18 days of protests; the police were. An independent fact-
finding study commissioned by former President Morsi confirmed that the police were 
responsible for “nearly all the killings and used snipers on rooftops overlooking Tahrir 
Square.”111  The seeming strength of the civil-military relationship makes this surprising, 
as one would expect the military to be willing to do what it takes to protect their 
benefactor. As Cook explains, though, “there is a split in the armed forces between the 
senior command on the one hand and junior officers and recruits on the other who would 
refuse to fire on protesters…the senior people never know whether those people below 
them will follow orders.”112 Demographic shifts, it appears, played a role in the military 
calculus to not shoot on the protesters, as the relatively young base of troops who would 
need to execute the violence did not feel strongly enough about the Mubarak regime to 
act on orders. What demographic shifts do not explain is how the economic investment in 
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the regime, the foundation of the civil-military relationship and main method of coup-
proofing, affected the military’s decision making. 
Graph #8 displays trends in daily protest size and deaths from the start of the 
protests to the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power.   
Graph #8: Egypt Daily Protest Size and Deaths 
 
What is immediately clear about this graph is that there was a prolonged period of 
large protest size and high death rates before the regime collapsed. Even after the military 
declared that it would not harm the protesters, violence escalated in two separate 
instances. The qualitative analysis in Chapter #4 indicated that as violence spiked, 
militaries were more likely to defect and regimes collapse. The point of defection in the 
Egyptian case did come during a spike in violence on the 31st and 1st, but the reluctance 
of the military did not immediately cause the regime to collapse: another 11 days passed 
before Mubarak was forced from power. Moreover, the size of the protests tended to stay 
within the 4-5 range for the 11-day in between period of the military’s declaration and the 
*The dotted line indicates the 
point at which the military 
declared that it would not harm 
the protesters.  
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fall of Mubarak. The week and a half of violence after the military’s declaration would 
not harm the protesters thus begs the question of what effect the military defection really 
had. In order to tease this out, we must cross reference the day-to-day events with the 
trends displayed in Graph #8. 
The military entered into the conflict on January 28th on the heels of a spike in 
violence on the 27th.  Graph #8 shows that the entrance of the military stabilized the 
violence until the 31st, and their public statements were strongly in support of the regime 
throughout this period. On the 29th, for example, the army stated that “anyone who breaks 
curfew will be in danger.”113 The military, although not directly perpetrating violence 
against the protesters, aligned themselves as ambassadors of the regime when first 
deployed. The 30th reinforced this notion, as the military brass met with Mubarak in a 
cordial meeting and F-16 fighter jets flew over the protests in a show of force meant to 
intimidate the protesters into submission. Although the announcement that the military 
would not use force against protesters may seem like a defection, the actions of the 
military continued with the posture since their deployment on the 28th: despite not using 
force, the military continued to stand by Mubarak and attempted to end the protests with 
their “sugar daddy” safely in office. Violence spiked on the 2nd, but the military let the 
plainclothes Mubarak supports enter Tahrir Square and did nothing to actively protect the 
protesters. They continued to fire shots in the air as late as February 9th as an intimidation 
and dispersion technique. The Egyptian defection, clearly, was a reluctant one and much 
less responsive to violence than the data might indicate.  	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It is through this reluctance that we can best understand the role of the civil-
military relationship’s importance in dictating the outcome of the protest movement. 
Mubarak’s chief method of coup proofing in Egypt was through economic benefits. With 
such a high level of investment in the national economy, the military could be predicted 
to stand by the regime that so enabled them. And for a majority of the protests, they did. 
The main role of the military was to protect infrastructure and economic assets, not to 
protect the revolution. Given the military’s investment in the economy, such a role aligns 
with their institutional interests. When the military’s economic interests became threated 
on after attempting to reopen the country for business on February 6th and 7th only to see 
protests shut down the economy again on the 8th did the military really begin to turn away 
from Mubarak as a cohesive institution. When Mubarak refused to step down from power 
on the 10th and the protesters responded with increased determination and anger on the 
11th, the military saw a prolonged period of economic shut down if it did not act. It was at 
this point that the military defected from the regime wholesale, enacting a bloodless 
coup. 
While perhaps the most popular image of the Arab Spring of the military 
embracing crying protesters in an apparent triumph of humanity, the reality is less clean. 
The police and security forces used relatively high levels of violence and the military 
remained somewhat loyal to the regime despite not committing a massacre until their 
economic interests were threatened. It in a ironic twist, therefore, it was choice of 
Mubarak’s coup-proofing mechanism that ultimately undid his rule, as it was the catalyst 
for the military’s defection and his subsequent deposition. The economic interests that 
caused the military to stand by their sugar daddy caused them to dispatch with him. 
Tunisia: Eager Defectors  
 
 Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali came to power in Tunisia in 1987 via a bloodless coup 
after a career as an Army officer and head of intelligence.114 He gained a reputation for a 
willingness to repress dissent as Head of Intelligence and effectively rooted out the 
Islamic Tendency Movement in 1986.115 This reputation followed him to the presidency, 
which he held without much of a challenge until the December 2010 protests that would 
prove to be his undoing. 
 The Tunisian military was kept small, isolated and ineffective throughout Ali’s 
tenure. Whereas force sizes in the MENA region averaged 18.88% of the male population 
between the ages of 18-32, Tunisia’s military employed a meager 4%.116 Likewise, the 
defense budget was far below other North African countries at 1.2% of GDP, compared 
to 3.8% in Algeria, 2.2% in Egypt, 3.3% in Morocco and 2.8% in Libya.117 As Parsons 
and Taylor point out, “the Tunisian National Guard, the cornerstone of the internal 
security forces, was allocated 50% more funds in 2010 than the Tunisian army, navy, and 
air force combined.”118 Foreign Policy analyst Ellen Knickmeyer adds that the Tunisian 
army is of an anomaly in the region for more than its’ size: its level of professionalism 
and its separation from the autocratic regime are unlike any other MENA regime; “the 
military often resists foreign aid, scoffing at such patronizing treatment;” and “Ben Ali 	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deliberately dispatched conscript-filled military ranks to the perimeter of the country to 
do public-works projects, disaster relief, and other good deeds—and to stay out of 
trouble.”119 The military’s equipment, largely imported from France and the United 
Stated States, was outdated or obsolete.120 Whereas the civil-military relationship in 
Egypt was founded on the coup proofing mechanism of economic incentives to stand 
with the regime, the Tunisian civil-military relationship is founded the converse coup 
proofing mechanism: political and economic marginalization and keeping the military ill-
equipped. There is no reason to believe that the Tunisian military had any investment in 
the status quo.  
 Despite this seemingly weak civil-military relationship, an Intermediate level of 
violence was still used in Tunisia against protesters. What role did the military play in 
this? A day-by-day breakdown of the events will allow us to gain a better understanding 
of the military’s role in the Ben Ali’s collapse.121 
 December 17th-24th 
 The protests famously began when Mohammed Bousazizi, a 26 year old Tunisia, 
doused himself in paint thinner and lit himself on fire in response to the police 
confiscating his fruit cart and beating him. The demonstrations began in earnest, 	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spreading throughout Tunisia within days. Violence was not reported in this initial stage 
of protests. 
 December 24th and 25th  
 The first reports of state violence against the protests emerged on December 24th. 
A protester was shot and killed during protests in the Sidi Bouzid region.122 The police 
fired shots in the air in an attempt to disperse protesters throughout Tunisia.123 Two 
others were reported injured.124 
 The violence continued on the 25th, with another man shot dead in Bouziane by 
police and several others injured.125 Again, the police were responsible for the death. 
 December 27th through January 7nd  
 Although no deaths were reported on the 27th, the police used batons and tensions 
continued to rise as protests continued unabated.126 Most importantly, the protests spread 
to the capital, Tunis. Similar clashes and reports of police brutality continued on the 
throughout the week, but there was little to no escalation in the violence.127   
 Protests continued throughout the next two weeks, but the only significant violent 
event occurred on January 3rd. A student demonstration, mostly by students, in Thala saw 
the police respond by firing tear gas, including one canister that fell into a mosque. No 
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deaths were reported.128 Strikes, especially by lawyers, continued throughout the week, 
although no violence was reported at those demonstrations. The military still had not 
entered the conversation and the police continued to be the government’s response to the 
protests. 
 January 8th – 13th  
 January 8th marked the beginning of a serious escalation in both violence and 
protests. Demonstrations spread to multiple cities throughout the country, including Tala, 
Kasserine, and Rgeb.129 Six people were reported shot and killed by security forces in 
Tala, along with three in the Kasserine.130 These incidents were the first reported use of 
live ammunition pointed directly at the protesters.  
 The violence continued to escalate throughout the weekend, although reports were 
sketchy, making a true day-by-day analysis impossible. By the 10th, though fourteen 
civilians were killed throughout the weekend and military vehicles were reported as 
rolling into Thala on the 10th.131 132 
 English language reporting was still scrambling to piece together what was 
occurring on the ground between the 11th and the 12th, but it is clear that the crackdown 
continued with disproportionate force through both days. Police were reported to have 
continued to fire live ammunition in the air to disperse the crowd in Tunis, while four 
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additional protesters were reported shot and killed in Kasserine, the site of the most 
violence from earlier in the week.133 134 
Witnesses told the New York Times that the army had used rooftop snipers to fire 
on the crow throughout the four-day crackdown that was quickly inflating the death 
toll.135 More credible analysis done by Al-Jazeera after the fact (in February 2011), 
however, found that while snipers were used on protesters, they were not military 
personnel.136 Originally, the police were used to attempt to quell the demonstrations, but 
when that failed the infamous BOP (Brigades de l’Ordre Public) were brought in, 
proceeding to use teargas, rubber bullets and hand-hand-hand combat against 
protesters.137 With the protesters still not budging, a special militia of national police 
force and presidential guard who had been discharged for serious infractions was brought 
in, and they were the ones who carried out the sniper attacks.138 The Al-Jazeera article 
goes on to explain “These agents were given comfortable front positions as civil servants 
in various government ministries. To guarantee their loyalty, they received a second 
salary and other perks.”139 Their unique status within the Tunisian coercive apparatus was 
reinforced by the fact that they were not carrying weapons from the Austrian arms 
manufacturer Stery Mannlicher as the rest of the armed forces do.140  
No incidents were reported on the 13th.  	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January 14th  
Ben Ali gave a speech the night of the 13th promising not to stand for reelection in 
2014, declaring emergency rule and directed police and security forces not to use 
violence on Tunisians, but protests continued unabated the next morning demanding his 
immediate resignation.141 Protesters and police quarreled in Tunis’ city center for the 
time, although tear gas was the only method of protest repression reported.142 The 
military was as active as it had been throughout the protests, taking control of the air 
space and the airports.143 Still, no violence was needed to do so, and with Ali’s departure 
that night, the military went through the protests with no violence. 
Analysis 
Amnesty International concluded that some 230 protesters died in the upheaval 
throughout the country, along with over 700 injured.144 Tunisia’s military is the most 
celebrated in the Arab Spring. Army Chief of Staff Gen Rachid Ammar proclaimed the 
Tunisian military as “guarantors of the revolution” and, as the first country to experience 
Arab Spring protests, they were the first military to refuse to use force against the 
protesters. Nonetheless, intermediate levels of violence were still used, and as the 
aforementioned Al-Jazeera study points out, the relatively high levels of violence were 
because of a militia. How, then, should we understand Tunisia in the context of civil-
military relations and violence in defense of the regime? 
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Graphs #9 and #10 provide a visual representation of the use of violence over 
time. 
Graph #9: Tunisia Daily Protest Size and Deaths (bar) 
Graph #10: Tunisia Daily Protest Size and Death (plot) 	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rounds if needed.”145 Instead, the escalation of violence depicted in Graphs #9 and #10 
show that the police and militia greatly escalated the conflict and led to the military 
defection. Unlike in Egypt, the military made no attempt to quell the protests. Perhaps the 
best way to compare the two militaries’ repression efforts is to compare the timeline of 
the escalation of violence until the respective leaders’ deposition: in Egypt, a full 11 days 
of violence passed, whereas in Tunisia, violence began rising on the 9th, but Ben Ali fled 
on the 14th—only 5 days. This should come as no surprise given the status of the military 
in Tunisian society under Ben Ali: they were marginalized, kept small, and essentially 
irrelevant. They had no incentive to maintain the status quo by opening fire on 
civilians—indeed, as the aftermath of the revolution would indicate, the military 
benefited much more by defecting, as they gained national respect in the aftermath of the 
revolution that they did not previously have under the Ben Ali regime.  
Conversely, the militia was intensely invested in the regime’s survival. Although 
they are domestic, the militia operated as a mercenary force: they were hired to be 
accountable only to the person who was paying them, not to the domestic constituency. 
Their unique position in Tunisian society made it so that they were invested in the status 
quo, if only for a paycheck. The members of the militia had histories that would not be 
protected under a different regime. Nonetheless, the militia was not sufficiently large 
enough to deal with the protests throughout the country or effectively suppress the 
growing protests in Tunis that eventually pushed Ben Ali from power; indeed, the 
protests grew even faster across space and time in the wake of the Kasserine shootings on 
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the 12th. Without the support of the regular military, there was a lack of overwhelming 
force to truly suppress the demands of the protesters. 
What, then, does this tell us about the effect of civil-military relations on the 
Tunisian protest movement? First, it is clear that the military acted in its institutional 
interests as the violence escalated by defecting from the Ali regime. With Ali’s grip on 
power weakening as violent repression attempts backfired, the military seized the 
opportunity to push a leader that did them no favors aside and craft their own legacy in a 
post-Ali Tunisia. As a coup proofing mechanism, therefore, marginalization seems to be 
ineffective and counterproductive for an autocratic leader in the face of domestic protests. 
Second, while specialized forces such as the Presidential Guard or a militia for-hire will 
stay loyal to the regime, they are not sufficient to the suppression of a mass, nation-wide 
protest movement. Indeed, in Tunisia they actually had the opposite effect: rather than 
deter the protesters from continuing their efforts, protest size rose when violence was 
used. Finally, despite being marginalized and ill-equipped, the military was still the 
linchpin upon which the protest movement hinged. All other components of the coercive 
apparatus remained loyal to Ben Ali, but their coercive capacity was still not sufficient to 
disperse the protesters. It is impossible to know if the repression would have been 
successful if the military remained loyal to the regime, but it is clear that the conflict was 
trending against the Ben Ali regime even before the military made the decision to defect. 
  
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   77	  
Bahrain: Emphatic Loyalty 
  Bahrain is a tiny majority Shiite island off the coast of Saudi Arabia that has been 
ruled by the Sunni Al-Hhalifa family since the late 18th century and the current Emir, 
Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, has been in power since 1961 (but he did not take the 
title of Emir until 1971).146 Bahrain has a population of just fewer than 1.25 million 
people, with just under half of who are Bahraini nationals (the rest are mostly male Asian 
migrant workers).147 Of the Bahraini nationals, it is believed that close to 70% of the 
population is Shiite and 30% are Sunni.148 Although governed under minority rule, 
“Bahraini Shiites do not face religious oppression per se” but instead regularly see jobs 
go to and the government be dominated by Sunnis.149  
 In what is the most thorough analysis of the Bahraini military (albeit slightly 
outdated, everything points to the fact that none of the big picture implications on civil-
military relations have changed), Cordesman notes that “military service is not a popular 
career, and few native Shiites are allowed into the armed forces—at least half of 
Bahrain’s officers, NCOs and technicians are native. Bahrain is, however, heavily 
dependent on foreign contract personnel for support,” including a substantial number of 
Sunni Pakistanis, Jordanians, and Sudanese.150 Its civil-military relationship is therefore 
mercenary based, with the rest of the military following a tribally dependent monarchy 
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structure: only those of the regime’s tribal identity are allowed in the military. The police 
and the internal security forces are both kept heavily Sunni as well.151  
It is important to also note that in 1995, Bahrain agreed to house the US Navy’s 
5th Fleet in Bahrain, with an Admiral and roughly 1,500 Navy personnel.152 Bahrain also 
maintains security agreements with Great Britain and is a member of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, working especially closely with Sunni ruled Saudi Arabia.153 Thus, 
there is significant and powerful foreign investment in stability in Bahrain to compliment 
the military’s investment in regime stability.  
Bahrain had a strong civil-military relationship before the protests began in 
February of 2011. It was the only Monarchy to experience Intermediate violence and the 
only regime to survive comfortably after crossing the Intermediate threshold (the 
violence is ongoing in Syria, so it is not yet considered a full survivor). How did the 
military contribute to the survival of the regime, especially having looked at how the 
militaries helped end the tenures’ of Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali? What role did violence 
play in Bahrain’s stability? Again, this section will go present the day-by-day use of 
violence as a protest repression method before analyzing the civil-military relationship. 
Bahrain’s protest movement was not as concentrated and does not have a definitive end 
point of regime collapse as the Egyptian and Tunisian case studies do, so the author thus 
uses his best discretion to present a timeline that accurately captures the effects of the 
military and violence in the protest outcome. The day-by-day analysis ends at the point 	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that the regime is considered as safe in the face of the protests, although protests have 
continued since that time. 
 February 14th 
 After seeing successful protests overthrow leaders in Egypt and Tunisia, 
Bahrainis staged sporadic protests in villages throughout the island and in the capital 
Manama in what was dubbed the “Day of Rage.”154155 Police fired teargas and rubber 
bullets at the crowds, with one protester dying from a rubber bullet wound.156 Beatings 
were also reported. 
 February 15th 
 In the second day of protests, only one death was reported, as police again killed a 
demonstrator, this time at the 10,000 person funeral march for the man who died the 
previous day.157 158After the funeral, the King gave a speech in which he granted the 
protesters Pearl Square, but a police helicopter continuously circled the Square.159 It did 
not interfere with the protests, however. The rest of the day and night continued without 
incident. 
 February 16th saw the protests continue without incident. 
 February 17th  
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 February 17th saw an escalation in violence, as hundreds of riot police officers 
used tear gas and concussion grenades against demonstrators who spent the night in Pearl 
Square.160 Four people were killed by live police fire, and the Square was cleared.161 162 
 Making their first appearance since the outbreak of the protests, the military 
moved into Pearl Square and issued a stern warning to stay away from the Square, as it 
would do “whatever was needed to maintain security.”163  
 February 18th 
 The next morning, protesters returned to the streets despite warnings from the 
military. The military responded by opening fire on the protesters, with more than 230 
hurt.164 165 166 The firing began when the protesters made their way towards Pearl Square. 
Shots were reportedly fired from a helicopter, a nearby high rise building, and from the 
ground.167 There was no reliable death toll reported. 
 February 19th 
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In a whiplash-inducing pivot the day after the military carried out attacks on protesters, 
the government withdrew its forces and allowed the protesters back into Pearl Square.168 
169 The protesters were allowed to continue their protests without incident until mid-
March. 
March 13th 
After weeks of relatively peaceful protests, with the military and police forces 
sidelined, police and protesters clashed on March 13th. Rubber bullets, water cannons and 
tear gas were fired when protesters left Pearl Square and headed to the Financial 
District.170 Police were the only government representatives involved.  
March 14th 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Troops entered Bahrain to bolster domestic 
forces in a renewed effort to suppress the protesters. Most came form Saudi Arabia.  
March 15th 
The King declared a three-month state of emergency, giving the nation’s armed 
forces chief the authority to take any and all measures to “protect the safety of the 
country and its citizens.”171 Another two people were killed in clashes with military 
personnel.172 
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March 16th  
The 16th saw government forces—both police and military—violently storm Pearl 
Square, forcibly removing protesters.173 Hundreds of troops, backed by helicopters and 
tanks, streamed through the central square, killing three protesters.174 The next days saw 
the tearing down of Pearl Square and an end to the immediate protests. With martial law 
declared and the recent display of force, the Bahraini Arab Spring was effectively 
suppressed, although there would be insignificant protests in the future. After the March 
16th taking of Pearl Square, there has been no doubt that the Bahraini monarchy remains 
stable for the foreseeable future. 
Analysis 
  The Bahraini army clearly made the decision to stand by the regime. They were 
willing to exert disproportionate and overwhelming force and, as such, were able to 
effectively repress the protest.  
Graph #10 shows the size of protest across time in Bahrain. The Arab Spring 
project at BYU has not yet collected data on deaths in Bahrain, but using the day-to-day 
analysis from this case study and matching events with trends in protest size, it is possible 
to get a better understanding of how Bahrain’s military was influential the in the 
repression of the Arab Spring movement. 
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Graph #10: Bahrain Size of Protest 
	  
While the Mecham database does not include events before February 22nd, the 
effect of the March 16th actions of the military very clearly: after peaking immediately 
before the clearing of Pearl Square, protests moved back down to 2, spent another day at 
3, and then took a steady path of decline. The show of force seemingly worked, as the 
size of protest receded after the violence, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, where the protests 
accelerated after episodes of escalation in violence.  
The willingness of the military to act decisively on behalf of the government 
should not come as a surprise, as the mercenary nature of the army would indicate that 
the troops are not beholden to the protesters in any way. Importantly, the addition of 
Saudi and GCC troops did not really have much of an effect on the willingness of the 
military to act violently towards the protesters: the military had already shown throughout 
the February protests that they were more than willing to use excessive and deadly force 
to protect the regime. If it did anything, the additional troops simply gave the Bahraini 
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forces enhanced suppression capability, as the March 16th raids showed. Likewise, the 
tribally dependent component of the military proved to be effective. The ethnic 
composition of both the regular military and the mercenary army—Sunni against Shiite—
ensured that the king retained a second layer of loyalty from the military, as the military 
risked losing social and economic benefits for their religious faction should the monarchy 
fall. 
In Bahrain, therefore, coup-proofing strategies proved effective. By relying on 
forces from outside the country, the regime minimizes the threat of a coup because a non-
Bahraini officer is less likely to aspire to the Bahraini throne. By only recruiting Sunni 
soldiers, the regime guarantees that the military would stand to lose should they be 
overthrown. In a popular protests scenario such as the Arab Spring, both coup-proofing 
mechanisms proved useful: the military had nothing to gain by deposing the king and 
much to lose if he was overthrown. 
Chapter	  #5:	  Synthesis	  and	  Comparative	  Analysis	  
 With the three case studies now complete, it is possible to reflect on what insights 
each case provides on the role of civil-military relations in regime stability, especially 
when compared to other cases. Moreover, the findings of the case studies can be viewed 
in light of the findings of the quantitative analysis done in Chapter 3.  
Although the three case studies have more differences to analyze than similarities, 
one similarity unites all three: each military acted in its institutional interest, attempting 
to maximize their own benefit much more than attempting to serve as protectors of the 
population as the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries have both been given credit for. The 
civil-military relationships did dictate the actions of each military, as they were the basis 
on which political calculations were made by each military. In Tunisia, the civil-military 
relationship made it best to push Ali out of power; in Egypt, the civil-military 
relationship made it so the military attempted to keep Mubarak in power, but had to 
abandon him when he no longer served their institutional interests; in Bahrain, the civil-
military dynamic guaranteed the unconditional loyalty of the military. And most 
importantly, in each, the military’s decision proved to be the deciding factor between 
regime collapse and survival. When the military decided to abandon the leader, the leader 
fell and when the military decided to stand by the leader, he remained in power. The 
divergence of the two seemingly similar cases in Tunisia and Egypt will provide the most 
insight into the role of the civil-military relationship. 
When comparing Tunisia and Egypt, it is clear that the two civil-military 
relationships are very different, despite both falling into the autocratic-officer politician 
category. On the one hand, the Egyptian military enjoyed a special position in Egyptian 
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society, with economic benefits and a strong social situation for military leadership. On 
the other hand, in Tunisia, the military was pushed the periphery, both economically and 
politically. Where we can see the civil-military relationship coming into play was in the 
Egyptian army’s seemingly reluctant decision to stand by the protesters, as they did their 
best to disperse the crowds without firing on protesters, while the Tunisian army 
mobilized and immediately decided to protect the protesters. The Egyptian army was 
much more willing to stand by the regime than the Tunisian military was, reflective of the 
strength of the civil-military relationship. This points to two important takeaways: first, 
that there is significant behavioral variation within groupings in Kamrava’s typologies 
and second, that coup-proofing methods were essential in determining the specific actions 
of the militaries. 
In Bahrain, the calculus was entirely different than in Egypt or in Tunisia: when 
police was not able to contain the movement, the military swept in with decisive force. 
The military’s actions on February 18th and March 16th demonstrated a willingness to 
unequivocally stand by the regime. Bahrain is categorized as a Mercenary army, so the 
domestic political calculus is not like Tunisia’s or Egypt’s. If the regime falls, a 
mercenary army has nothing to gain and everything to lose—they lose their employment, 
social status, and possibly more. Moreover, Bahrain operates on a tribally based military 
structure as a second level of civil-military relations, furthering insuring the loyalty of the 
military. As a minority-ruled society and a military that is reflective of the ruling, not the 
ruled, the military was not just fighting to keep the regime in power; they were also 
fighting to maintain their special position in society. If the Shiite majority were to take 
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power away from the Sunni monarchy, it is safe to assume that the benefits would 
quickly dry up for the Sunni population.  
The three case studies allow us to grapple with Hypothesis #4, which posits that 
coup proofing played an instrumental role in the military’s response to the protests. In 
Tunisia and Bahrain, it is abundantly clear that this is true: the coup proofing strategy of 
marginalizing in Tunisia backfired as the military defected immediately. The coup 
proofing strategy of hiring mercenaries and keeping religious unity within the military 
worked in Bahrain, as the military stood firmly by the regime. In Egypt, the picture is less 
clear. The coup proofing strategy of having the military deeply invested in the economy 
seemed to work as the military stood by the regime for the first part of the protest. 
Although they did not shoot on the protesters, they repeatedly attempted to end the 
protests with shows of force. Here, it is clear that the coup proofing strategy worked. 
When the military pushed Mubarak out of power, however, it was for the same reason as 
when the military stood by the regime: the economy. The seemingly paradoxical calculus, 
while not as clear as Tunisian or Bahraini coup proofing methods, does indicate the 
effectiveness of using the military as a coup proofing technique: it is effective until the 
regime becomes detrimental to the military’s economic interests, at which point the 
military will act in its own institutional interests. Hypothesis #4, therefore, we can see as 
confirmed: coup-proofing strategies did influence the institutional calculus of the military 
as the organization decided how to respond to the Arab Spring movement. 
The macro-data indicated that higher levels of violence would result in in regime 
collapse and all three of the case studies used higher levels of violence. For two, Tunisia 
	   	   O’Mealia	  	   88	  
and Egypt, that was indeed the case, whereas Bahrain did not collapse. This data 
highlighted a causation problem: did the regime collapse as a result of the violence or 
was there violence because of the impending regime collapse? The same problem was 
presented with the defection variable: did the military defect because of the violence or 
did the military’s defection/fracturing cause the violence? The case studies indicate that 
the use of violence did indeed entrench protesters, resulting in larger protests and harder 
demands. Where the collapse/no collapse paths diverge are the willingness to go beyond 
an Intermediate level of violence. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the military refused to allow 
the country to escalate into a civil-war level of violence. Bahrain’s unified and 
overwhelming response, while not pushing the country into High levels of violence, 
served as a stern enough warning of what would come if the protests continued. The 
ongoing conflict in Syria is, if the current status quo is maintained, another example: by 
going “all-in” on using violence against dissent, the Assad regime has avoided collapse. 
While the military fractured to an extent and a Civil War has resulted, the civil-military 
relationship has proven strong enough that the regime still wields the force to prevail. 
Libya also followed the Syria and Bahrain path, with the use of High levels of violence. 
Gadhafi, however, did not make it through the conflict, as the leaders in Syria and 
Bahrain managed to. Fracturing certainly occurred throughout the Libyan ranks a la 
Syria, but it is not unreasonable to think that Gadhafi may have been able to endure the 
conflict without foreign intervention by the United States. The outside interference on the 
side of the protesters-turned-rebels completely changed the equation, making Libya 
impossible to place within this developing trend. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe a 
general trend of the success of overwhelming violence in repressing the regime and the 
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failure of underwhelming violence. Of course, the optimal choice, no violence, was the 
most successful. 
Finally, the case studies found that although their decisions were the most 
important variable in determining whether the regime would collapse or remain stable, 
militaries were not the primary perpetrators of state violence against citizens. Instead, 
police and specialized militias were responsible for most of the violence. Chapter 3’s 
analysis indicated that violence levels dictated military defection rates, but if they were 
not the entity committing the violence, why would their actions respond to it? Again, 
institutional interests seem to dictate the military calculus here: as the violence between 
police or small, specialized units escalated, the regime was put in an increasingly tenuous 
position. In order to fully repress the protests, a truly overwhelming display of force 
would be required to end the protests. Such a display of force would damage the 
military’s reputation and cost them in equipment, men, and power. By siding the 
protesters, the militaries were able to maximize their reputation and political capital while 
saving money, resources, and men.  
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Chapter #6: Conclusion 
This paper found that civil-military relationship did dictate the outcome of the 
protests at high levels of violence. As violence escalated, defection or fracturing occurred 
across all cases in Autocratic Officer Politician and Dual civil-military relationships and 
where defection or fracturing occurred, regimes tended to collapse. Syria was the only 
case that ran counter to this trend, but the conflict there is ongoing at the time of this 
writing. This paper also found that there was not a significant difference between 
defections and fracturing on regime collapse other than where fracturing occurred, 
violence tended to push past the Intermediate level and into High. The civil-military 
relationship had no effect on the outcome of protests in countries in which violence was 
kept to low levels. Within classifications of civil-military relationships, the coup proofing 
strategies employed by the regime caused some variation in military response. 
Nonetheless, the coup proofing measures ironically led the military to defect or fracture, 
thus leading to the collapse of the regime.   
Hypothesis #1, which stated that regimes that maintained a stronger civil-military 
relationship were the most likely to survive serious challenges the regime’s grip on 
power, was found to be partially true. The civil-military relationship only became a factor 
when the regime began using intermediate levels of violence, but when serious violence 
was introduced, the civil military relationship played a central role in dictating the 
outcome. The case studies indicated that mercenary and tribal loyalty was a strong civil-
military relationship, but that the AOP and Dual militaries were relatively weak. 
Hypothesis #2, which theorized that states willing to use violence at high levels 
against protesters were the regimes that collapsed, whereas those that did not use violence 
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survived the challenge, was also found to be mostly true. Only those regimes that used 
high levels of violence collapsed, so the second clause was proven entirely correct: 
regimes that did not use violence survived the Arab Spring protests. However, 
Intermediate levels of violence were the most susceptible to collapse, while High 
violence had a curious split that is difficult to decipher because of the ongoing conflict in 
Syria and the international intervention in Libya. What was clear was that an escalation 
of violence followed by a defection by the military guaranteed collapse.  
Hypothesis #3, which posited that higher levels of violence resulted in military 
defection or fracturing, which in turn led to regime collapse, was proven as true. The only 
counter example to this hypothesis was Bahrain, the only mercenary based military and 
monarchy to experience Intermediate or High levels of violence. Syria is also an outlier, 
but the ongoing conflict makes it so that we cannot make a judgment on how the 
fracturing of its military will affect regime stability in the long term. Beyond these two 
exceptions, it is clear that in Autocratic Officer Politician and Dual military states that 
escalating violence against citizens leads to either defection or fracturing. When 
fracturing or defection occurs, states tend to collapse. 
Hypothesis #4, which said that coup-proofing mechanisms played an instrumental 
role in dictating military response to the protests, was confirmed. In Tunisia, the coup 
proofing mechanism of marginalization made it so the Tunisian military had no 
investment in the regime, leading to its defection; in Egypt, the military’s investment in 
the economy made it reluctant to defect from Mubarak, but ultimately the economic 
interests of the military made it so that the military could no longer support their 
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benefactor; and in Bahrain, the emphasis on religious solidarity throughout the ranks 
ensured that the military remained loyal to the regime. 
Although this study focused exclusively on Arab civil-military relations, the 
findings can give us insight into non-Arab protests situations. From a U.S. foreign policy 
perspective, the findings of this paper could help forecast events in Cuba should a mass 
antigovernment protest movement like those that occurred in the Arab Spring. Cuba’s 
autocratic structure is closely related to that of the Arab dictatorships examined in this 
paper: it is a Personalist dictatorship, Fidel and Raul Castro were and are autocratic 
officer politicians, respectively, and the regime came to power as through a rebellion that 
was supported by a strong populist ideology.175 Moreover, the Castro regime has used 
repression extensively to stamp out domestic dissent and has had difficulty developing its 
economy, resulting in an overeducated population and high unemployment.176 Many of 
the macro-level conditions in Cuba mirror those of pre-2011 Arab world.  
 This paper, then, would allow us to predict some of the outcomes of such a protest 
in Cuba, with obvious implications for U.S. foreign policy. First, if violence escalated to 
intermediate or high levels, the military would be predicted to fracture or defect and then 
the regime would be predicted to collapse; second, if the regime were not to respond with 
violence, the Castro regime would be able to hold on to power; third, initial violence 
would be perpetrated by internal security forces and the police, with escalation most 
likely coming from a highly ideological security division with intense ties to the regime. 	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A Cuban protest movement would be expected to follow along the same general 
trajectory of the cases presented within this paper.  
Future studies might consider examining the political relationship and makeup of 
these entities, attempting to gain a better understanding of their willingness to use force 
against protesters. Moreover, the elite security forces remain (intentionally) opaque and 
future research, if possible, might look into illuminating their structure, recruitment 
methods, and doctrine. As a general rule, Arab militaries do not publish the ethnic, 
religious, or social makeup of their troops. Analysts are forced to rely on sweeping 
statements such as ‘Bahrain’s military is predominantly Sunni.’ Access would be 
difficult, but such a study would greatly enhance the political science community’s 
ability to understand the military’s actions in mass protests such occurred in the Arab 
Spring. Finally, almost all scholarship in response to the Arab Spring has examined the 
cases that saw Intermediate and High levels of violence, while those that experienced 
Low-No violence have garnered essentially no attention. It is important that scholars 
examine what allowed the majority of countries not to escalate to higher levels of 
violence, so that the international relations community might better understand how to 
avoid the death and destruction caused by situations such as Syria, Libya and, on a lesser 
scale, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen. 
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Appendix	  
Civil-Military Relations and Violence 
 None Low Intermediate High 
Autocratic Officer-
Politician 
 2 3 1 
Dual  2  1 
Mercenaries  1 1  
Independent 2 2   
Tribally Dependent 
Monarchy 
1 2   
Chi-Square test results: p= .357044 
Civil Military Relations and Regime Type 
 Autocratic 
Officer-Politician 
Dual Mercenaries Independent Tribally 
Dependent 
Monarchy  2 2  3 
Personalist 5 1    
Military 2     
Democracy    3  
Theocracy  1    
Chi-Square test results: p= .000292 
Civil-Military Relations and State Collapse 
 Autocratic Officer-Politician Dual Mercenaries Independent 
Tribally 
Dependent 
Collapse 3 1    
No Collapse 4 2 2 3 3 
Chi-Square test results: p= .37647614 
Violence and State Collapse 
 None Low Intermediate High 
Collapse   3 1 
No Collapse 4 9 1 1 
Chi-Square test results: p= .00939793 
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Violence and Regime Type 
 None Low Intermediate High 
Monarchy 1 3 1  
Personalist  1 3 2 
Military 1 1   
Theocracy  1   
Chi-Square test results: p= 0.383350502	  
Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with High-Intermediate Violence 
 Autocratic Officer-Politician Dual Mercenaries Independent 
Tribally 
Dependent 
Collapse 3 1 (Libya)    
No Collapse 1 (Syria)  1 (Bahrain)   
 
Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with No-Low Violence 
 Autocratic Officer-Politician Dual Mercenaries Independent 
Tribally 
Dependent 
Collapse 3 2 1 3 3 
No Collapse 	   	   	   	   	  	  
